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Felzen v. Andreas: The Seventh
Circuit Shuts Its Doors to
Derivative-Suit Appeals by
Unnamed Shareholders
INTRODUCTION
Imagine this:
You own 300 shares of stock in ABC, Inc. Since you purchased
the stock five years ago, ABC, Inc.'s profits have increased signifi-
cantly and as a result, the value of its stock has nearly doubled.
Through several other investments, you have diversified your port-
folio and are now very active in managing several investments.
Unexpectedly, you hear that a United States Grand Jury is
investigating possible violations on the part of ABC, Inc.'s direc-
tors. Dozens of suits were filed, many of which were consolidated
into one shareholders' derivative suit.
As a resident of Arizona, you feel remote and unattached to
the litigation taking place in Illinois. Similarly, because your in-
vestment in ABC, Inc. is only one of several others in your portfo-
lio, monitoring the legal status of your investment interest seems
valueless. Nevertheless, the named representative plaintiffs' coun-
sel continue to pursue the claim.
Three weeks later, you receive notice that a settlement has
been preliminarily approved. While assessing the settlement, you
determine that its terms are unfair. Specifically, the settlement
offers minimal compensation to you and the corporation as com-
pared to the large sums received by counsel in the form of past and
future fees.
You are frustrated because the value of the stock is sure to
depreciate. Furthermore, the benefits of the settlement are inade-
quate. Various dissatisfied shareholders appear in the District
Court of Delaware to voice their objections to the settlement. De-
spite the shareholders' complaints, the court approves the pro-
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posed settlement. Two shareholders file an appeal to contest the
fairness of the settlement.
Scenario 1-The Objection Requirement
The appellants are entitled to an appeal because under this
procedure, they are only required to appear in the district
court to object to the settlement.
Scenario 2-The Intervention Requirement
The appellants are unable to appeal. To appeal the settle-
ment it is necessary to become a formal party to the record
through intervention, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The scenarios suggested in this hypothetical depict two very
different procedural possibilities confronting unnamed sharehold-
ers' who wish to challenge the fairness of a settlement. For the
past thirteen years, courts have applied each of the two procedures
inconsistently, leaving adversely affected litigants guessing as to
which particular procedure governs. 2 In general, the disagreement
among circuits necessarily led to inconsistent judgments and corre-
sponding uncertainties regarding the outcome of particular dis-
putes. Moreover, because unnamed parties in representative suits
have legally protected interests that are often difficult to monitor,3
such parties need settled rules to adequately protect their inter-
ests. In other words, the rights of unnamed parties must be suffi-
ciently safeguarded by sound, practical and consistent procedure.
The issue of an unnamed party's right to appeal applies to two
types of representative litigation-the class action 4 and derivative
1. The term "unnamed shareholders" refers to represented shareholders in
derivative litigation. They are represented by the named plaintiff, who is the
party of record in the action. Likewise, the term "unnamed class members" refers
to represented class members in class action suits.
2. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in Felzen v. Andreas, overturned over
twenty years of precedent requiring a class member or shareholder to object in the
underlying proceeding in order to appeal an adverse decision. Felzen v. Andreas,
134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998); infra Part II.B.
3. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1308-10 (3d Cir. 1993) (dis-
cussing various agency costs inherent in class and derivative actions).
4. The class action is a device governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, whereby a large group of similar claims are joined and adjudi-
cated as one for purposes of judicial economy and the ability to aggregate a large
number of claims with relatively small value that are not worth individual litiga-
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suit.5 In the context of class actions, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure allows a named plaintiff to bring and maintain a
suit as the representative of a class of similarly situated litigants
when certain requirements are met.6 Further, the rule protects
represented parties by requiring court approval of dismissal or
compromise and that "notice of the proposed dismissal or compro-
mise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs."7 For derivative actions, Rule 23.1 sets forth, in
essence, the proper party to bring a derivative action, the required
contents of the complaint and the conditions under which a share-
holder may not proceed with the suit." Similar to Rule 23, Rule
23.1 provides protection to the represented individuals by requir-
ing court approval of a dismissal or compromise and notice to all
shareholders. 9
Most class actions and derivative suits are settled prior to a
judgment on the merits. 10 Unnamed shareholders or class mem-
bers often seek an appeal in response to an allegedly unfair settle-
ment because interests of unnamed parties are often ignored in
settlement agreements. Most courts and commentators agree that
settlements in representative litigation are marred by agency
costs: unnamed class members and shareholders in class and de-
rivative actions are unable to competently monitor the suit and
tion. See Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 1.01 (3d ed.
1992). The suit is brought by a named representative plaintiff on behalf of all
individuals who are part of the class. See id. Any recovery inures to each individ-
ual class member, depending on the type and extent of the injury claimed. See id.
5. The derivative suit is an action, under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, by a shareholder who seeks to enforce a corporate cause of action.
The action is derivative "when the action is based upon a primary right of the
corporation, but is asserted on its behalf by the stockholder because of the corpora-
tion's failure, deliberate or otherwise, to act upon the primary right." Black's Law
Dictionary 305 (6th ed. 1991). Unlike the class action, any recovery inures directly
to the corporation and only indirectly to shareholders.
6. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); infra note 36 (providing the text of Rule 23).
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see infra note 36.
8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1; infra note 112 (providing the text of Rule 23.1).
9. Pursuant to Rule 23.1, "[the action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compro-
mise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court di-
rects." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1; see infra note 112.
10. See Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of
Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 542, 544-45
(1980) (finding that a vast majority of derivative suits are settled prior to
judgment).
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often, conflicts of interest between plaintiffs' counsel and the liti-
gants lead to unfavorable results for unnamed members.'1 There-
fore, the rights of unnamed members remain unprotected,
especially considering the predominance of unfair settlements in
class and derivative actions.
This Note focuses on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Felzen v.
Andreas.12 In Felzen, two unnamed shareholders were denied an
appeal of the district court's settlement approval in a derivative
action.13 The Seventh Circuit disallowed the appeal because the
two unnamed shareholders failed to intervene in the lower court. 14
On writ of certiorari, an equally divided United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's aforementioned decision in
the case of California Public Employees' Retirement System v.
Felzen.15 Hence, the Supreme Court held that unnamed share-
holders must do more than object in the lower court in order to be
entitled to an appeal.
The dispute in Felzen focused on two alternatives that would
entitle an unnamed shareholder to appeal an unfavorable settle-
ment. The first alternative, for the purposes of this discussion, is
referred to as the "objection requirement."16 This practice is less
burdensome to the represented party because it does not require
11. See infra Part III.E.
12. 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998).
13. Id. at 874-76.
14. See id. The named shareholder plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on
the grounds that the unnamed shareholders had not intervened in the underlying
proceeding pursuant to Rule 24. See Brief for Petitioners at 9, California Pub.
Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732). The
Seventh Circuit granted the motion to dismiss for want ofjurisdiction, holding that
the unnamed shareholders could not appeal the settlement because they did not
intervene in the district court. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 873-77. Intervention, pur-
suant to Rule 24, is a device by which non-parties may become formal parties to
the action when an applicant, upon timely motion, claims an interest that is sub-
stantially related to the subject of the action, and that the disposition of the action
without the applicant may severely impair his or her ability to protect that inter-
est. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24; see also infra note 64 (setting forth the requirements of
Rule 24).
15. 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (per curiam). The California Public Employees' Re-
tirement System (one of the two unnamed shareholders who appealed to the Sev-
enth Circuit) petitioned for the writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. See 67
U.S.L.W. 3049 (U.S. July 21, 1998) (No. 97-1732).
16. The term "objection requirement" refers to the proposition that a repre-
sented party may appeal without first becoming a named party to the suit. In-
stead, a right to appeal is preserved if the represented party appears in the lower
court to object to a proposed order. See infra Part I.
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him to become a named party (party of record) to be entitled to an
appeal; it is sufficient that the party appears and objects to the
proposed order in the lower court. 17 The procedure's history can be
traced back to English Common Law, and until the United States
Supreme Court's decision in California Public Employees' Retire-
ment System, it was the preferred practice in the Third Circuit.' 8
The second alternative is the intervention requirement. 19 In
order to preserve a right to appeal, the unnamed party must inter-
vene in the suit pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.20 The intervention requirement differs markedly from
the objection requirement because it obligates an unnamed party
to formally become a party of record under Rule 24.21 In addition,
this procedure may be especially burdensome. Unnamed parties
and their attorneys are faced with both economic and time con-
straints. For instance, they must first hire an attorney, who, in
turn, must review the case and prepare a motion to intervene. Un-
like the objection requirement, this procedure garnered support
only recently-it developed as the preferred procedure in several
circuits and, in the context of derivative suits, is now mandatory
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Califor-
nia Public Employees' Retirement System.22
While focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in Felzen v. Andreas, this Note argues that
unnamed parties in each type of representative litigation-the
class action and derivative suit-should receive different treat-
ment in terms of a right to appeal. Traditionally, courts have
treated unnamed shareholders and class members equally in
terms of a right to appeal.23 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Felzen is insightful because it distinguishes between the
17. See infra Part I.
18. See id.
19. The term "intervention requirement" refers to the procedure that requires
an unnamed party to become a formal, named party to the action pursuant to Rule
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.
20. See infra note 64.
21. See infra Part I.
22. In the context of class actions, this practice is supported by the Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits. See 5 James Win. Moore et
al., Moore's Federal Practice § 23.1.10 (3d ed. 1999).
23. Research on the issue leads me to this conclusion. Until Felzen, courts did
not provide separate analyses for class and derivative actions. See infra Part I.
This Note contends that separate treatment is warranted. See infra Part III.
1999]
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derivative suit and class action; it acknowledges that an unnamed
shareholder in derivative litigation is in a very different position
than a class member in a class action.24 Nevertheless, the court
found the differences to be insignificant in light of an unnamed
shareholder's right to appeal. Thus, this Note argues that while
the Seventh Circuit's method of reasoning was appropriate, its
analysis disregarded several important factors that should have
led the court to the opposite conclusion. That is, shareholders in a
derivative suit have a stronger argument in favor of appeal via the
objection requirement than do class members in the context of
class actions.
Part I of this Note provides a historical summary of caselaw on
the issue. It furnishes separate treatment for each type of repre-
sentative litigation-the class action and derivative suit. In addi-
tion, each section incorporates the relevant rules of procedure.
Part II is a statement of the case, Felzen v. Andreas, as well as a
synopsis of the Seventh Circuit's opinion. Part III provides an ar-
gument against the intervention requirement for unnamed share-
holders in derivative actions. In general, the discussion will
consider the premise that the differences between derivative suits
and class actions mandate their separate treatment in terms of an
unnamed party's right to appeal.
Various reasons support this conclusion. First, this Note criti-
cizes the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that unnamed class mem-
bers in class actions have a stronger argument for a more liberal
appellate procedure than unnamed shareholders in derivative ac-
tions. Actually, a closer look at the differences between class and
derivative actions reveals that the very opposite is true-share-
holders in derivative actions have a greater right to appeal, with-
out intervention, than individuals in class actions. Second, greater
protection for shareholders' rights and increased court supervision
in the context of derivative actions benefits our economy by fur-
thering the incentive for shareholder investment and deterring in-
adequate corporate management practices. Third, regarding the
issue of appellate rights in representative litigation, this Note ar-
gues that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afford significantly
less protection to shareholders in derivative actions. Thus, share-
holders should enjoy rights that would allow them to protect their
24. Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998).
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interests through appeals. Fourth, the Seventh Circuit's support-
ing authority in Felzen is inapplicable to whether a shareholder
must intervene in derivative suits. Finally, the prevalence of un-
fair settlements in derivative suits warrants a more liberal appel-
late procedure for shareholders in such actions. For these reasons,
this Note concludes that shareholders in derivative actions should
not be required to intervene under Rule 24 in order to appeal a
settlement in a derivative action.
I. MAY UNNAMED PARTIES APPEAL? A HISTORICAL SUMMARY
The issue of an unnamed party's right to appeal can be traced
back to nineteenth century-England. Unlike the relatively com-
plex class action and derivative suit of today, representative litiga-
tion was once analyzed solely on principles of equity. Thus, many
early cases favored a more liberal appeals procedure for unnamed
parties-courts were concerned more with what was fair in a par-
ticular situation and less with rigid procedural rules.
Not surprisingly, several-nineteenth century cases in our legal
system followed the equitable approach of England's common
law.25 These early decisions stand for the proposition that un-
named parties have a right to appeal when their interests are af-
fected in the original proceeding.26 In fact, many twentieth-
25. See generally William Weiner & Delphine Szyndrowski, The Class Action,
From the English Bill of Peace to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: Is There a
Common Thread?, 8 Whittier L. Rev. 935 (1987) (explaining the development of
the class action under Rule 23 from the early Bill of Peace and manor cases in
England).
26. Several early cases in our legal system held that an unnamed party has a
right to appeal. See Hinckley v. Gilman, 94 U.S. 467, 468-69 (1876); Butterfield v.
Usher, 91 U.S. 246, 248-49 (1875); Milwaukee R.R. Co. v. Soutter, 72 U.S. (1 Wall.)
660, 662 (1866); Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 69 U.S. (1 Wall.) 609, 634-35 (1864);
see also Frederic Calvert, Parties to Suits in Equity 1-38 (1837) (arguing that those
with an interest in the "object" of the suit should be made parties). For example,
under principles of equity, an unnamed party is afforded judicial review if his
rights are affected in an underlying proceeding. In Blossom v. Milwaukee R.R. Co.,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 655 (1863), the United States District Court for the District of
Wisconsin ordered a decree foreclosing a mortgage and commanding a sale of a
road in a suit against the Milwaukee and Chicago Railroad Company. Blossom bid
on the road at a marshal's sale, but the sale never materialized. See id. He ap-
peared in the district court seeking to validate the sale, See id. The court refused
the sale and Blossom challenged this order on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. See id. On a motion to dismiss the appeal, the Supreme Court
was to consider whether Blossom, who was not a named party to the underlying
suit, had a right to prosecute an appeal. See id. At the outset of the Court's opin-
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century decisions are grounded in equitable principles stemming
from the Nineteenth century.27 In West v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum
Corp.,28 Judge Learned Hand held that a creditor, who was not a
party of record, had standing to appeal where the decree in the
original suit affected his legal interests. 29 Judge Hand noted that
the appellant was "invited" to appear for the purpose of confirming
an agreement to settle debt because he was sent notice of the pro-
posed agreement.30 In short, numerous early twentieth century
ion, Justice Miller recognized that the appellant had no right to appeal from any
decree made prior to his bid for the land. See id. Justice Miller noted the differ-
ence in the case at hand because the appellant had acquired an interest in the
proceeding by way of his bid on the land. See id.
It, however, seems to be well settled, that after a decree adjudicating cer-
tain rights between parties to a suit, other persons having no previous
interest in the litigation may become connected with the case, in the
course of the subsequent proceedings, in such a manner as to subject them
to the jurisdiction of the court, and render them liable to its orders; and
that they may in like manner acquire rights in regard to the subject mat-
ter of the litigation, which the court is bound to protect.
Id. at 65-66.
The Court subtly points out two important principles that afford a right to
appeal to an unnamed party. First, the appellant "may become connected with the
case" by subjecting himself "quoad hoc" to the jurisdiction of the court. Id. For
example, the party appears at the proceeding so as to announce his interest in the
matter. See id. Second, a party may have acquired legal rights that entitle her to
an appeal. See id.
27. See Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 25, at 935-77. On suits in equity,
Justice Story stated:
[ilt is a general rule in equity, that all persons materially interested,
either as plaintiffs or defendants in the subject matter of the bill ought to
be made parties to the suit, however numerous they may be. The reason
is that the court may be enabled to make a complete decree between the
parties, may prevent future litigation by taking away the necessity of a
multiplicity of suits, and may make it perfectly certain, that no injustice
shall be done, either to the parties before the court, or to others, who are
interested by a decree, that may be grounded upon a partial view only of
the real merits. When all the parties are before the court, it can see the
whole case, but it may not, where all the conflicting interests are not
brought out upon the bill.
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Some Problems in Equity 204 (1950) (quoting West v. Ran-
dall, 2 Mason 181, 190-91 (R.I. 1820)).
28. 70 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1934).
29. Id.
30. See id. The appellant in West was a creditor whose interests were affected
by a proposed agreement to settle a debt. Id. The appellant received notice of the
agreement and appeared to object to the proposed order. See id. Judge Hand held
that the appellant had standing because he was brought in "in invitum" (upon
notice from the court). Id.
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courts upheld an unnamed party's right to appeal when the party
was invited by the court to safeguard his rights. 31
In time, courts developed an "objection requirement" for un-
named parties. That is, to be entitled to an appeal, an unnamed
party need only object in the district court. For example, in the
1930 case of Pianta v. Reich,3 2 the Second Circuit concluded that a
non-party appellant had standing to appeal the lower court's order
in a receivership suit. According to the court, the appellant credi-
tor, although not an original party to the suit, had standing to ap-
peal because he appeared in the lower court to oppose the order.33
"The appellant, having appeared in opposition to the order to show
cause, is 'like a defendant who is summoned by process of court
and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal.'" 34 Although
some courts and commentators clearly advocated the "objection re-
quirement" later in the twentieth century,36 its roots stem back
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules.
A. The Class Action-An Unnamed Class Member's Right
to Appeal
In response to an evolving society, the drafters of the Federal
Rules promulgated Rule 23 to encourage the class action.36 The
31. For other situations in England in which unnamed parties were treated as
formal parties, see Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 25, at 954. For a discussion
of the link between English suits in equity and early American case law, see
Timothy A. Duffy, The Appealability of Class Action Settlements by Unnamed Par-
ties, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 933, 940-42 (1993).
32. 77 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1935).
33. See id. at 890.
34. Id. (quoting Christian v. R. Hoe & Co., 63 F.2d 218, 218 (2d Cir. 1933)).
Arguably, the phrase, "having appeared in opposition to" is synonymous with ap-
pearing and objecting to the court's order.
35. See infra Part II. Most courts, though, adopted the intervention require-
ment in class actions. See infra Part II.A. At the time Felzen was decided, the
Third Circuit adhered to the objection requirement in derivative actions. See infra
Part II.B; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
intervention was not required in the Third Circuit for derivative actions).
36. See 7a Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §1752
(2d ed. 1986).
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is
an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government. Where it is not economically feasible to
obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small
individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effec-
tive redress unless they may employ the class-action device.
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Deposit Guar. Nat'l. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). In pertinent part,
Rule 23 states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if(1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the inter-
ests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their in-
terests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient ajudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the,
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and na-
ture of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be Main-
tained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as
Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the de-
cision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all mem-
bers who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the mem-
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device has proven useful in two ways: (1) it'combines claims com-
mon to a multitude of persons, when it would be impracticable to
have each litigate separately and (2) provides access to the courts
when a particular claim would otherwise be lost because of the size
of the claim in relation to its cost.3 7
In essence, the class action permits the joining of multiple par-
ties in one single action as long as each claim involves similar
questions of law and fact that originate out of the same transaction
or event. 38 The trial court makes the initial determination of
ber from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance
through counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under sub-
division (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of
the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice pro-
vided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not re-
quested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and
the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which
this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) deter-
mining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent
undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or ar-
gument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in
such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of
any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of
the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the rep-
resentation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or de-
fenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to repre-
sentation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly;
(5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be com-
bined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as
may be desirable from time to time.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
37. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.02.
38. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.02.
544 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:533
whether a suit can be properly "certified" and maintained as a
class action.39 However, courts continue to disagree on the proper
interpretation of Rule 23.40 There is general agreement, though,
that Rule 23 is to be considered in light of its objectives:41 to pro-
mote judicial economy, provide a remedy when an individual ac-
tion is uneconomical or overly burdensome, spread costs of the suit
among the multitude of litigants and protect the defendant from
an excessive amount of claims (some of which could produce incon-
sistent judgments).42
The issue of whether unnamed class members may appeal in
class action suits highlights two crucial aspects of Rule 23. First,
any final judgment in a class action is binding on all class members
under principles of res judicata (claim preclusion) or collateral es-
toppel (issue preclusion).43 Thus, there are serious implications to
all class members who choose not to opt out of the class.44 Second,
Rule 23 requires notice to all class members in the event of dismis-
39. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.02. The trial court usually has broad
discretion in deciding whether to certify a class. See 5 Moore, supra note 22,
§ 23.04.
40. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.03.
41. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.03.
42. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.03. Indeed, the class action proves to be
beneficial, especially as our society expands. The class action is aptly explained in
light of its two purposes:
(1) to save time and energy by eliminating the need of joining and bring-
ing into court a large and unmanageable number of people thus avoiding a
multiplicity of actions; and (2) to provide a measure of fairness in those
situations where the law clearly presents a right which, individually, is
not worth pursuing by ensuring that a multitude has redress against
wrongs they might otherwise have foregone.
Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 25, at 935.
43. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.11.
44. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.11. In class actions maintained under
subdivision (b)(3), members of the class must receive notice so that they may be
excluded from the class, and consequently, any binding judgment in that particu-
lar suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3); see also infra Part III (arguing that an un-
named shareholder's inability to opt out of the class is significant in terms of
whether he or she should be able to appeal).
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sal or settlement.45 Indeed, these are just two features of the rule
that concern the rights of unnamed class members. 46
Subsequent to the adoption of Rule 23, courts applied the Sec-
ond Circuit's analysis in Pianta to class action suits. For instance,
in Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co.,47 the Third Circuit
permitted an appeal to an unnamed class member who knew the
terms of the settlement and chose not to opt out of its binding ef-
fect.48 The court noted the irony of appealing a settlement that
had already been approved by the unnamed class members. 49 In
allowing the appeal, however, the court stated that "ordinarily, ag-
grieved class members may appeal any final order of a district
court in proceedings held pursuant to Rule 23."50 The court em-
phasized that within a class, there may be groups of small claim-
ants who have no chance to prosecute their actions unless they join
in with the class.51 Consequently, for some class members, "the
option to join is in reality no option at all," and thus, they would
face "equally unpalatable alternatives-accept either nothing at
all [by opting out] or a possibly unfair settlement."52 Thus, the
Third Circuit favored a more liberal appellate procedure for un-
named class members.
In 1977, just a few years after Ace Heating, the Ninth Circuit
faced an almost identical situation in Marshall v. Holiday Magic,
45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; supra note 36 (providing the text of Rule 23). Rule
23(e) states that "[a) class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall
be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." Supra
note 36.
46. Additionally, to ensure that the rights of unnamed class members are pro-
tected, a plaintiff must satisfy certain prerequisites in order to sue as representa-
tive of a class. See supra note 36 (providing the text of Rule 23).
47. 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971). Ace Heating involved consolidated appeals
from the "Plumbing Fixture Antitrust Cases." Id. at 32. For the procedural his-
tory of the underlying litigation, see Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radia-
tor & Standard Sanitary Corp., 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa. 1971) and Philadelphia
Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
48. The appellants in Ace Heating were unnamed members of the plaintiff
class. Ace Heating, 453 F.2d at 32. Class members were given the opportunity to
opt out of the action knowing the terms of the proposed settlement. See id. at 32-
33.
49. See id. at 33.
50. Id. at 32.
51. See id. at 33.
52. Id.
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Inc.53 In Marshall, unnamed class members appealed a court-ap-
proved settlement in a class action alleging antitrust and securi-
ties violations. 54 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that because
"their legal rights [were] affected by the settlement," they were
able to appeal. 55
The Seventh Circuit also encountered a line of cases that ques-
tioned the appellate rights of unnamed class members. In Re-
search Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 56 the court held that unnamed
class members, who had not intervened or appeared in response to
notice of a proposed settlement, did not have standing to maintain
an appeal.57 Although the court denied the appeal, it stated that
"[i]f a class member intervenes or even appears in response to a
notice pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23(e) and ob-
jects to the dismissal or compromise, he has a right to appeal from
an adverse final judgment."58 Therefore, under Research Corp.,
where a class member receives notice of a proposed settlement, "a
person in disagreement with the terms of a settlement must take,
at least, these minimal steps to preserve his right to appeal."59 For
the time being, Research Corp. evidenced the preferred alternative
in the Seventh Circuit.60 Subsequently, in Armstrong v. Board of
School Directors,61 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Research
53. 550 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977).
54. Id. at 1175-76.
55. Id. (citing Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane, Co., 453 F.2d 30, 32-33
(3d Cir. 1971)).
56. 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
57. Id. at 1060-61.
58. Id. at 1060 (citation omitted); see also Carlough v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 5
F.3d 707, 713-14 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Ace Heating and holding that unnamed
class members could appeal a district court's approval or disapproval of a
settlement).
59. Research Corp., 425 F.2d at 1060-61. The ability to object to a court's or-
der depends on whether the class received proper notice, and thus, because class
members in Research Corp. had "both actual and constructive knowledge of the
settlement and since they took no steps to object to the settlement prior to the
entry of judgment, the appeal must be dismissed." Id. at 1061.
60. The Seventh Circuit, in Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998),
overruled Research Corp. See infra Part II.B.
61. 616 F.2d 305, 327 (7th Cir. 1980) (involving class members who were al-
lowed to intervene to contest a settlement approval and citing Research Corp. as
authority entitling a right to appeal an adverse judgment if the unnamed party
appears in response to Rule 23(e) and objects to a settlement); see also Patterson v.
Stovall, 528 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976) (allowing appeal to absent class members
where class members appear and object in underlying proceeding).
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Corp.62 Thus, an unnamed class member's right to appeal was
well settled in the Third, Ninth and Seventh Circuits.63
Beginning in 1987, a new line of cases proposed an interven-
tion requirement for unnamed parties who sought judicial review
of an unfavorable order. In essence, courts required an unnamed
class member to become a named, formal party to the record under
the intervention procedure set forth in Rule 24 of the federal
rules.64 In contrast to the objection requirement, intervention is
an additional procedural impediment because it demands a tripar-
tite showing that: (1) the intervenor has an interest in the action,
(2) a failure to intervene will impair an ability to protect that inter-
est and (3) the named parties do not adequately represent the in-
tervenor's interest. 65 In addition, intervention must be timely,
considering the extent to which it disturbs the proceedings or
prejudices the existing parties. 66
In 1987, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the intervention re-
quirement in Guthrie v. Evans.67 In Guthrie, an unnamed class
62. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 327.
63. The Seventh Circuit's position on the issue has changed. See infra notes
96-100 and accompanying text.
64. Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be per-
mitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the sub-
ject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's abil-
ity to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
protected by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United
States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to
intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state
the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth
the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
65. See Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 6.10, at 367-68 (2d ed.
1993).
66. See id. at 375.
67. 815 F.2d 626 (11th Cir. 1987).
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member attempted to appeal the district court's entry of final judg-
ment.68 In a case of first impression in the circuit,6 9 the court held
that the unnamed class member did not have standing to appeal
from a final judgment.70 The court's decision, however, is most no-
table for its analysis in support of an intervention requirement.
The court denied standing to the non-intervening unnamed class
member for three reasons:
[flirst, such individuals cannot represent the class absent the
procedures provided for in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Second, class members who disagree with
the course of a class action have available adequate proce-
dures through which their individual interests can be pro-
tected. Third, class actions could become unmanageable and
non-productive if each member could individually decide to
appeal. 71
In effect, to preserve an appeal, unnamed parties were obligated to
intervene under Rule 24.
The court in Guthrie asserted that an unnamed party had no
standing to appeal because it had not been determined that he or
she could satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.72 For example, Rule
23(a) requires that named parties will fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interests of the class.73 But unlike the named representa-
tive parties who may appeal but have decided not to, the unnamed
appellant has not necessarily met the class action prerequisites of
68. Id. at 627. In this inmate class action, the individual appellant sought to
challenge the prison conditions at a Georgia State Prison even though neither the
class representatives nor the class counsel appealed from the judgment of the dis-
trict court. See id.
69. The court noted that there were "no cases in this Circuit squarely on
point." Id. Additionally, the opinion stated that "[n]o case law ha[d] been located
in any circuit that resolves this issue." Id. The court wrote in reference to case law
on the specific issue of an unnamed party's right to appeal a final judgment. See
id.
70. See Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 627.
71. Id. at 628.
72. Id.
73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; supra note 36 (providing the text of Rule 23).
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Rule 23(a). 74 Thus, the appellant "has no standing to take any ac-
tion on behalf of the class."75
According to Guthrie, a second reason to deny the right to ap-
peal is because alternate avenues of relief are open to an objecting
party.76 Primarily, the objecting class member may move to inter-
vene as of right in the district court.77 Under Rule 24, an unnamed
party may become a party of record upon timely application of a
motion to the district court.78 This practice is encouraged in light
of the intervening parties' enhanced ability to "monitor the repre-
sentation of their rights."79 In addition, an objecting party may
seek relief in a collateral proceeding on the grounds of inadequate
representation.8 0 Indeed, this collateral attack is available even
after a final order in the district court.8 ' Thus, one may appeal on
the grounds of inadequate representation "when the class repre-
sentative in the prior suit failed to appeal from the trial court's
judgment."8 2 Of course, a claim of inadequate representation is
sensible considering that the objecting party has already appeared
in court to voice objections to the proposed order.8 3
Finally, a class member may opt-out of the class.84 This mech-
anism permits an individual to exclude himself from class repre-
sentation, thereby eluding a binding judgment and preserving a
right to pursue an individual claim.85 Ultimately, with the availa-
74. Unlike the original named plaintiffs, a court has not determined that the
unnamed class members can satisfy the Rule 23(a) prerequisites for class actions.
See Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 628; accord Croyden Assocs. v. Allelco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675,
678 (8th Cir. 1992); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071, 1073 (5th Cir.
1988).
75. Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 628.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See supra note 64.
79. Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 628 (citations omitted).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 69 (5th Cir. 1973).
83. But see Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Ad-
equacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 765,
773-92 (1998) (asserting that an unobstructed ability to collaterally attack ade-
quacy may not be the best solution).
84. See Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 628. Unlike class actions, shareholder derivative
suits do not permit shareholders to opt-out. Thus, in derivative actions, sharehold-
ers have no choice but to be bound by the court's final order. See infra Part III.B.
85. See infra Part III.B. It is important to note that an individual's ability to
opt-out is not available under a 23(b)(2) action for equitable relief; rather, the abil-
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bility of these remedies, "there is no need to permit an individual
to appeal a judgment with which the class representatives, and
presumably the majority of class members are satisfied."8 6 If indi-
vidual unnamed class members were able to appeal uncondition-
ally, they would frustrate the very purpose of the class action.
8 7
Before Guthrie, most courts allowed appeals from unnamed
parties as long as they had appeared and objected in the underly-
ing proceeding.88 It is sufficient to say that Guthrie, "the case that
appears to be the progenitor of the modem trend in the federal
courts,"8 9 introduced a formidable line of reasoning supporting in-
tervention in class actions.90
Following Guthrie, the Seventh Circuit decided two cases in
the 1990s that significantly altered its earlier position supporting a
more liberal avenue for appeals. In In re VMS Limited Partnership
Securities Litigation,91 the Seventh Circuit held that an unnamed
class member had no right to appeal the district court's post-settle-
ment order.9 2 The court noted that its analysis was influenced by
ity to opt out exists for a Rule 23(b)(3) action, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2). See supra
note 36 (providing the text for Rule 23).
86. Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 628.
87. See id. at 629.
88. See supra notes 28-63 and accompanying text.
89. Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1059 (6th Cir. 1994).
90. But see Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707 (3d Cir. 1993). The
Third Circuit, in Carlough, found Guthrie distinguishable in the context of settle-
ment appeals. Id. at 714. The court reasoned that unnamed class members have a
greater right to appeal settlements because they appeared and objected in re-
sponse to notice of the proposed settlement. See id. at 714.
We think that a nonparticipating class member in a litigated action
clearly would be in a less favorable position with respect to arguing that
he has standing to appeal than such a class member in a settled action.
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23(e) requires notice to class members of
proposed dismissals or compromises of class actions but says nothing of
litigated matters. This distinction suggests that a class member who is
not a named party would be recognized as having greater rights to partici-
pate in a settled case than in a litigated case.
Id.
91. 976 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992).
92. Id. at 369. The appellant filed formal objections to the proposed settle-
ment. See id. at 364. The settlement was later approved and the district court
made a post-settlement order approving the sale of land in which appellants had
an interest. See id. at 365. This appeal was denied because "[in spite of its inter-
est and participation in [the] [class [aiction prior to and after settlement, ERG
was not a named plaintiff in the lcIlass [aiction; ERG's posture as an unnamed
[class member curtails its right to appeal." Id. at 367.
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Guthrie and its progeny.93 However, because the case at hand con-
cerned an appeal of a post-settlement order, its holding did not dis-
turb an unnamed class member's right to appeal a settlement. 9
4
Thus, although the holding in In re VMS Limited Partnership was
limited to post-settlement orders, the Seventh Circuit laid a foun-
dation of change by "drawing on Guthrie's reasoning."95
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its preference for the interven-
tion requirement in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Anti-
trust Litigation.9" Led by Chief Judge Richard Posner, the court
denied standing to appeal from an order granting summary judg-
ment.97 This holding reflects Guthrie's concerns for judicial admin-
istration, i.e., that an appeal would frustrate the purpose of class
actions.98 Moreover, the aggrieved class members had other ave-
nues of relief such as opting out, creating subclasses, replacing the
class representative, or intervening in the action itself.99 In short,
the court concluded that "[ilf class members can file their own ap-
peals, the coherence of the class is destroyed, the scope of the class
action becomes unclear, and the control over the action becomes
divided and confused." 100 Once again, the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion did not totally foreclose the possibility of appeal by an un-
named class member who had not intervened. Like In re VMS
93. The court cited Guthrie and Walker in reference to "more recent cases"
that used a different approach in attacking the issue. Id. at 367-68. "We are draw-
ing on Guthrie's reasoning, however, to address the related issue of whether an
unnamed class member can appeal a post-settlement order implementing the set-
tlement agreement." Id. at 368 n.8; see also Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins.
Co., 861 F.2d 159, 164 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting Guthrie and Walker as case authority
that holds that an unnamed class member may not appeal from a final judgment
without having intervened).
94. Because the case at hand did not involve approval of a settlement, the
court noted that Research Corp. still controlled in that context. See In re VMS Ltd.
Partnership, 976 F.2d at 368; see also Carlough, 5 F.3d at 714 (excluding the inter-
vention requirement from settlement appeals).
95. In re VMS Ltd. Partnership, 976 F.2d at 368 n.8.
96. 115 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1997).
97. See id. at 457-58. The court also considered the right to appeal for plain-
tiffs who had opted out of the antitrust class action. See id. at 457. Relying on the
intervention requirement for nonparties, the court dismissed the appeal. Indeed,
the court "would be facing a veritable avalanche of appeals if all opt-outs could
appeal from any appealable judgment in the action." Id.; see also SEC v. Wozniak,
33 F.3d 13 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that intervention is necessary for appeal by
nonparties).
98. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 115 F.3d at 457-58.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 458.
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Limited Partnership, In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs did not
confront the issue of whether an unnamed party may appeal from
an order approving a settlement.
In 1993, the Tenth Circuit adopted the intervention require-
ment in Gottlieb v. Wiles. 10 Under the Guthrie rationale, the
court held that unnamed class members could not appeal the class
action settlement unless they had intervened in the district
court. ' 0 2 However, the court stated that intervention was required
only with an "absence of any violations of the Rule 23 procedures
intended to protect the rights of those unnamed class members."10 3
In addition, the Tenth Circuit found the appellants' reliance on de-
rivative suit precedent irrelevant to the issue at hand. 10 4 In this
regard, the Gottlieb opinion is notable because it declares that
"Rule 23.1 does not offer the same protective mechanisms offered
by Rule 23."1o5 Although not faced with the*precise issue, the court
implies that the distinct nature of derivative suits justifies its sep-
arate treatment'10 6
Until the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Guthrie, the appellate
procedure for unnamed class members was more flexible. That is,
courts generally allowed appeals in class actions when the dissatis-
fied class members appeared in the lower court to object to the
court's proposed order. In 1987, Guthrie and its progeny intro-
duced the intervention requirement for unnamed class members.
This line of cases offered a persuasive rationale, indicating that the
intervention requirement was the better practice for class-action
appeals. Thus, several circuits mandated the intervention require-
ment in the context of class actions.' 0 7
101. 11 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 1993).
102. See id. at 1007-13.
103. Id. at 1009. The court explained that if one of the protective provisions of
Rule 23 was neglected (such as notice to the class member of an approved settle-
ment), an unnamed class member does not have to intervene in order to appeal.
See id.; see also Silber v. Mabon, 957 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
objector had standing to appeal only the constitutionality of the notice procedure).
104. See Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1010-11.
105. Id. at 1011.
106. See id. at 1011 (citing Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules to the 1966
Addition of Rule 23.1, 28 U.S.C. App. 605 (1988)).
107. See Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 1994); Loran v.
Furr's/ Bishop's, Inc., 988 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1993); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004
(10th Cir. 1993); Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1992);
Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626 (11th Cir. 1987).
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B. The Derivative Suit-An Unnamed Shareholder's Right
to Appeal
The derivative action originated from principles of equity.108
It is a suit brought by a plaintiff shareholder as representative of
other fellow shareholders in a corporate cause of action.'0 9 The
corporation is the real party in interest, with the nominal plaintiff
shareholder "act[ing] in protection of its interest somewhat as a
'next friend' might do for an individual, because it is disabled from
protecting itself."1 0 Any derived benefit flows directly to the cor-
poration and indirectly to the shareholders."'
In 1966, the derivative suit was given separate recognition in
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."12 Similar to
Rule 23, Rule 23.1 mandates that (1) the derivative suit shall not
be compromised or dismissed prior to judicial approval and (2)
108. See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947).
109. See id. at 522.
110. Id. at 523.
111. See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations §145, at 341
(revised ed., 1946).
112. Legal principles underlying the derivative suit stem as far back as the
nineteenth century. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.1 App.01. Equity Rule 94
was promulgated in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Hawes v. Oakland. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.1 App.01 (citing Hawes v.
Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882)). Before the 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules,
derivative actions were managed under Rule 23(b). See 5 Moore, supra note 22,
§ 23.1 App.01. In 1966, Rule 23.1 was promulgated. See 5 Moore, supra note 22,
§ 23.1 App.02. It states:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may prop-
erly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1)
that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transac-
tion of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiffs share or mem-
bership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of law, and (2)
that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the
United States which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall
also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the
reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation or association.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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shareholders must receive notice of such a proposed order. 113
Moreover, Rule 23.1 provides that a derivative action may not be
maintained "if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and ade-
quately represent the interests of the shareholders or members
similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or asso-
ciation." 114 However, despite many similarities to Rule 23, the de-
rivative suit warranted a separate rule, in part because it is an
action that can proceed even when the shareholders are too few for
a class action. 115
Before the promulgation of Rule 23.1, the Sixth Circuit, in Co-
hen v. Young, 116 confronted the issue of whether an unnamed
shareholder could appeal a decree approving settlement in a deriv-
ative action. In Cohen, an unnamed shareholder appeared with
counsel to oppose the proposed settlement and file a petition to in-
tervene in the action." 7 Ultimately, the court rejected the petition
to intervene and approved the settlement "upon the sole ground
that it was recommended by the attorneys of record."" 8 The ob-
jecting shareholder's appeal was met by a motion to dismiss be-
cause the appellant was not a named party to the original suit and
therefore, had no standing. 119
The Sixth Circuit held that the appellant was "entitled as of
right to prosecute the appeal." 120 The court cited Pianta, reason-
ing that the appellant, as an interested stockholder, responded to
notice of a proposed settlement' 2 ' and, thus, was "like a defendant
who is summoned by process of court and after an adverse ruling
113. "The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs." Id.
114. Id. In contrast to the class action, where a preliminary finding of ade-
quacy must be made by the court, the adequacy of a representative plaintiff in a
derivative suit need not be assessed at its outset. See Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d
1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993).
115. See 7c Wright, supra note 36, § 1821.
116. 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942).
117. Id. at 723. The denial of intervention was inapposite to the court's deci-
sion because the appellant did not appeal this portion of the district court's order.
See id. at 724.
118. Id. at 724.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. See id.
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has the right to appeal."122 In short, the court applied the more
liberal objection requirement to a derivative suit appeal.
In 1975, the Seventh Circuit approved of the objection require-
ment as applied to derivative actions in Tryforos v. Icarian Devel-
opment Co. 123 In Tryforos, an unnamed shareholder responded to
Rule 23.1 notice in order to object to a proposed dismissal of the
case.124 After the lower court denied the objections and dismissed
the action, the court announced that the "the law is clear that a
non-party shareholder who appears, pursuant to a Rule 23.1 no-
tice, to present objections to a proposed dismissal or settlement of a
derivative action may appeal an adverse decision even though he
has not been formally made a party to the action." 125 By explicitly
applying the issue to Rule 23.1 actions, the Seventh Circuit reaf-
firmed a right to appeal for objecting shareholders in derivative
actions.
More recently, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger,126 the Third
Circuit encountered a settlement appeal by unnamed shareholders
in a derivative suit. In particular, three shareholders objected in
the lower court, asserting that the settlement agreement accorded
no benefit to the corporation-only to defendant directors and
plaintiffs' counsel. 127 After the district court approved the settle-
ment, the unnamed shareholders appealed to the Third Circuit.128
The named plaintiffs argued a "no-intervention, no-standing"
rule-the appellants lacked standing because they were not named
parties and because they failed to intervene in the lower court.129
122. Id. (quoting Pianta v. Reich Co., 77 F.2d 888, 890 (2d Cir. 1935)).
123. 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975).
124. Id. at 1260. Presumably, the objections of the unnamed shareholder were
critical-the shareholder, a resident of Greece, hired counsel to represent him and
tender written objections on his behalf. See id. at 1261-62.
125. Id. at 1263 n.22. The court cited Pianta and Cohen as authority for this
proposition. See id.
126. 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993).
127. See id. at 1305. In an earlier settlement with the Pennsylvania Attorney
General, Bell Atlantic was required to pay over $40 million for alleged violations of
unfair practices and consumer protection laws. See id. at 1306 & n.2. Under the
derivative suit settlement, Bell Atlantic agreed to reveal certain information in its
upcoming proxy statement and agreed to follow new sales and marketing proce-
dures in exchange for a release of all present and future claims relating to the
allegations. See id. at 1306-07. In addition, the settlement awarded plaintiffs'
counsel fees and expenses not to exceed $450,000. See id.
128. See id. at 1307.
129. Id.
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This was a worthy argument in light of the recent trend towards
the intervention requirement in class actions.130 Nevertheless, the
court held that the shareholders had standing to appeal because
they had appeared in the district court to present objections to the
proposed settlement. 13 1 Accordingly, the decision to allow appeals
by the objecting shareholders reaffirmed earlier precedent in the
circuit. 132 In addition, it followed the approach of other circuits
that allowed appeals by unnamed, non-intervening parties.
The Third Circuit's analysis is significant for two reasons.
First, although Bell Atlantic Corp. involved the appeal of a settle-
ment in a derivative suit, the court analyzed the issue collectively
with class action precedent. 133 The Third Circuit did, though, ad-
dress the differences between the two types of suits, indicating that
a separate analysis may be warranted.134 The court did not, how-
130. See supra Part II.A; Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675 (8th Cir.
1992); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626 (11th Cir. 1987). In addition, the United
States Supreme Court mandated intervention, but on distinguishable facts. See
Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (per curiam). In Marino (discussed thor-
oughly in Parts II and III), an appeal was denied to non-party white police officers
who were not class members in the underlying suit and who otherwise were wholly
unattached to the proceedings. Id.
131. See Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1310.
132. Cf In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d
1058 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that an objecting pledgee had standing to appeal with-
out having intervened in the underlying derivative action). Although not on point,
the Bell Atlantic court also cited Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., ex-
plaining that "[olrdinarily, aggrieved class members may appeal any final order of
a district court in proceedings held pursuant to Rule 23." Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at
1308-09 (quoting Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 32 (3d
Cir. 1971)).
133. For class and derivative actions alike, the court compared the intervention
requirement in the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits with the different ap-
proach (objection requirement) followed by the Third, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits. See Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1307-09.
134. See id. at 1307-08 n.4. The court noted one difference is that in derivative
suits, any recovery inures in whole to the corporation on whose behalf the suit was
brought, whereas in class actions, individual class members recover directly de-
pending on the nature and extent of each claimed injury. See id. (citing In re Pitts-
burgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d at 1068). In addition,
the court recognized "that one of the rationales offered in support of an interven-
tion requirement cannot apply to derivative actions. That is, unlike members of a
class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), 'shareholders normally cannot opt out of the
class and pursue their own individual action.'" Id. (quoting American Law Insti-
tute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.02,
at 635 (Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31, 1992)).
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ever, consider whether different procedures should apply because
the parties did not assert the issue.135
Second, Bell Atlantic Corp. differentiates between an un-
named party's appeal of a court's judgment and an unnamed
shareholder's or class member's appeal of a settlement in a class or
derivative action.136 The court's supposition rests on the idea that
unnamed shareholders and class members should possess a more
flexible procedure for appeals than non-parties who are not con-
nected to the suit in any way.' 37 Moreover, the court emphasizes
that a settlement appeal should be more accessible than an appeal
of a judgment on the merits of the case. 138 In support of this prop-
osition, the court provides an extensive analysis of the propensity
for unfair or collusive settlements in derivative suits.139 In short,
the Bell Atlantic Corp. opinion indicates that the intervention re-
quirement is unsuited for settlement appeals in derivative
actions. 140
In Rosenbaum v. MacAllister,141 the Tenth Circuit elaborated
on the distinctions between class actions and derivative suits. The
litigation involved a combined class action and derivative suit.142
An objecting shareholder/class member, who had not intervened,
objected to a settlement proposal on grounds that the $2,500,000 in
135. See Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1307-08 n.4.
136. Id. at 1307-08. Essentially, the court is distinguishing the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Marino, which required intervention when non-par-
ties tried to appeal a consent decree, from the issue at hand, a settlement appeal in
a derivative suit. See id. Part III.D contains a more thorough discussion of Ma-
rino. See infra Part III.
137. See Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1307-10.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 1309-10. Specifically, the court noted collective action problems,
where a large number of shareholders each have relatively small claims. See id. at
1309; infra Part IV. Moreover, agency concerns are often problematic in derivative
suits because "it is counsel for the class representative and not the named parties,
who direct and manage these actions." Bell Att. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1309 n.7 (quoting
Greenfield v. Villager Indus. Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973)); infra Part
III.E. Finally, the court referred to shareholders' inability to monitor the status of
their claims in derivative litigation when their cost of monitoring the action often
exceeds any resulting benefit. See Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1309-10; infra Part
III.E.
140. Certainly, the court's ultimate rejection of the intervention requirement
was due in large part to concerns about settlement agreements in derivative ac-
tions. See Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1309-10; see also Part III.E (providing a more
in depth discussion of settlement problems in representative litigation).
141. 64 F.3d 1439 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. See id. at 1441.
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attorneys' fees was outrageous as compared to the minimal eco-
nomic benefits accruing to the corporation and shareholders. 143
After the lower court approved the settlement and the unnamed
party appealed, the Tenth Circuit held that the appellant had
standing to appeal the attorneys' fees-and-expenses portion of the
settlement.144 -
Significantly, the Tenth Circuit allowed an appeal of the class/
derivative action settlement, notwithstanding its intervention re-
quirement for class actions. 145 The court declared that the ration-
ale behind the intervention requirement did not apply to a non-
intervenor's right to appeal attorneys' fees and expenses in class or
derivative suits.14 6 In short, the subject of the appeal, the amount
of fees and expenses awarded to the lawyers, would not trigger the
primary detriments resulting from an appeal of a settlement-de-
laying benefits to class members and deferring resolution of the
defendant's liability. 47 In its application to derivative suits, the
court found that an even greater right existed for shareholders to
appeal attorneys' fees and expenses because (1) there is no chance
to opt out of a derivative suit 4s and (2) "the court's fee award-to
be paid out of the corporate treasury-would seem not to delay the
benefits of the settlement."149 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
proclaimed that the intervention requirement definitely did not ap-
ply to an appeal of attorneys' fees in a derivative action; arguably,
it should not apply to an appeal of any kind in a derivative
action.150
Traditionally, courts did not distinguish between derivative
suits and class actions when determining appellate rights for un-
named parties. Until 1987, no circuit required intervention in
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1441-43.
145. See id. at 1442-43; see also Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 1993)
(requiring intervention for a right to appeal settlement in a class action).
146. See Rosenbaum, 64 F.3d at 1442.
147. See id. at 1442-43.
148. Although it offered no rationale for this significance, the court opines that
shareholders in derivative suits should have a right to appeal without interven-
tion, due to the fact that they never are afforded a chance to opt out of the settle-
ment in the first place. See id. at 1443; cf Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304,
1307-08 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting the importance of a shareholder's inability to opt
out in derivative actions).
149. Rosenbaum, 64 F.3d at 1443.
150. See infra Part III.
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either type of representative litigation. The reasoning behind the
intervention requirement as propounded in Guthrie-maintaining
control of a class of litigants-was persuasive in the context of
class actions. However, the Third and Tenth Circuits were correct
in not applying Guthrie's analysis to a derivative action. In fact, no
court has ever required intervention in the context of an unnamed
shareholder's right to appeal a settlement in a derivative suit.
That is, until Felzen v. Andreas,151 when the Seventh Circuit
jumped on the intervention bandwagon.
II. FLZE V. ANDREAS
A. Lower Court Proceedings
On June 28, 1995, the Archer Daniels Midland Company 152
(hereinafter referred to as ADM) disclosed to the public that three
separate federal grand juries were investigating possible federal
antitrust law violations. 153 Subsequently, several shareholders
brought civil suits against ADM and its directors for allegedly vio-
lating both federal antitrust and securities laws. 154 Specifically,
shareholders filed three derivative suits in the United States Dis-
trict Court in Illinois, and fourteen other derivative actions in Del-
aware, the state of ADM's incorporation. 55
151. 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998).
152. Archer Daniels Midland Company will hereinafter be referred to as
"ADM." ADM is a corporation in the business of producing food additives such as
high fructose corn syrup, lysine and citric acid. See In re Archer-Daniels-Midland,
Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 95 C 3979 & 95 C 4006, 1995 WL 645673, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
1, 1995).
153. See Brief for Petitioners at 2, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.
v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732). In December of 1996, the federal
grand jury indicted former ADM executive vice president Michael Andreas, Ter-
rance Wilson (former president of ADM's Corn Processing Division) and Kazutoshi
Yamada (managing director of Anjimoto Corp.). See 13 No. 8 Andrews Corp. Off. &
Dir. Liab. Litig. Rep. 16 (Feb. 23, 1998). "It was reported that Mark Whitacre, the
president of ADM's fast-growing BioProducts Division, had been an informant for
the FBI and had recorded conversations of high-level ADM officials discussing
price-fixing and other anti-competitive tactics." Id.
154. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, California Public Employees'Retirement Sys-
tem (No. 97-1732); In re Archer-Daniels-Midland Inc. Sec. Litig., 1995 WL 645673
at *1.
155. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. 10-K, Sept. 29, 1997, WL SECNOW, at
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In mid-1996, the derivative suits were consolidated in the Cen-
tral District of Illinois. 156 Paul Felzen, as trustee of the Louise
Laskin trust, and Sandra Esner were named plaintiffs for the con-
solidated derivative action in the district court. 157 The complaint
alleged "gross mismanagement" on the part of ADM's board.158
The shareholders sought to recover $190 million that ADM had al-
ready paid in criminal fines and civil settlements. 159 On May 29,
1997, the company proposed a settlement to counsel for the share-
holder-plaintiffs. 8 0 In essence, the settlement terms consisted of
"$8 million to be paid by or on behalf of certain defendants in these
actions to the company and certain changes in the structure and
policies of the Company's Board of Directors."' 6 ' The parties
mailed notice of the proposed settlement (pursuant to Rule 23.1) to
all ADM shareholders with directions to appear in the district
court if they had any objections. 162
Two unnamed shareholders (California Public Employees' Re-
tirement System and Florida State Board of Administration) ap-
peared in the district court to voice their objections to the
156. These derivative suits were aggregated as In re Archer Daniels Midland
Inc., Derivative Litig., Consolidated No. 14403. See id. at 89. On November 1,
1995, the court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the proceedings to the
United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. See In re Archer
Daniels Midland Inc., Securities Litig., 1995 WL 645673, at *1.
157. See Brief for Respondent at ii, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.
(No. 97-1732). Although not a shareholder himself, Paul Felzen is "a properly au-
thorized representative who [may] bring a derivative suit on behalf of a corpora-
tion in which the trust or estate owns shares." Moore, supra note 22,
§ 23.1.0713] [c] [ii]. Named defendants included nearly all then current directors of
ADM (as well as the corporation itself as nominal defendant). See Brief for Peti-
tioners at ii, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. (No. 97-1732); Archer
Daniels Midland Co. 10-K, Sept. 29, 1997, WL SECNOW, at 88.
158. See Brief for Petitioners at 5, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.
(No. 97-1732).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 6. Rule 23.1 mandates judicial approval of any settlement. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
161. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 10-K, Sept. 29, 1997, WL SECNOW, at 89.
About half of the $8 million fund was allocated to past attorneys' fees, while the
other half was for future attorneys' fees "to be incurred by ADM in attempting to
reform itself." Brief for Petitioners at 6, California Pub. Employees' Retirement
Sys. (No. 97-1732).
162. See Brief for Petitioners at 7-8, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.
(No. 97-1732).
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settlement.' 6 3 Essentially, the objectors argued that the cash
award (all of which was allocated to attorneys) and the promises
for reform in corporate governance were inadequate. 16 4 On July 7,
1997, the district court granted final approval of the settlement.' 65
Subsequently, the two objecting shareholders, who were not
named parties in the District Court proceedings, appealed to the
Seventh Circuit in disapproval of the settlement.166
B. The Seventh Circuit's Decision
In January of 1998, the Seventh Circuit, comprised of Chief
Judge Posner and Circuit Judges Easterbrook and Flaum, handed
down a decision that proved to be worthy of Supreme Court re-
view.167 The appeal presented the Seventh Circuit with the spe-
cific question of whether unnamed shareholders in derivative
litigation, who appear and object to a proposed settlement in the
district court, but do not intervene at any time, may nevertheless
appeal the court's settlement approval. 168 Ultimately, the court
163. The shareholders objected to the settlement "on the grounds that it pro-
vided little or no benefit to the corporation: the cash benefit was all to lawyers and
was excessive, and the corporate governance 'concessions' provided no material
benefit to shareholders beyond what ADM had itself adopted a year earlier." Id. at
8. Of course, the actual benefits of the settlement are in dispute. In fact, one com-
mentator described the settlement as "state of the art in American corporate gov-
ernance today." Brief for Respondent at 4, California Pub. Employees' Retirement
Sys. (No. 97-1732).
164. See Brief for Petitioners at 6, 8, California Pub. Employees' Retirement
Sys. (No. 97-1732).
165. See id. The court found the settlement to be fair and reasonable, stating
that "the overwhelming reaction to the proposed settlement [by shareholders] has
been acceptance." Brief for Respondent at 5-6, California Pub. Employees' Retire-
ment Sys. (No. 97-1732).
166. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1998). The two un-
named shareholder appellants are California Public Employees Retirement Sys-
tem (CalPERS) and Florida State Board of Administration (FSBA). See id. at 873.
Calpers, "the biggest U.S. public pension fund ... has billions invested in more
than 1,600 U.S. companies." CalPERS Softens Its Proposed Standards For Corpo-
rate Governance in the U.S., Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL
WSJ 3486094. Together, both pension finds own more than 4.5 million shares of
ADM common stock; less than 1% of ADM's 530 million shares of common stock
outstanding. See Brief for Respondent at 4 & n.8, California Pub. Employees' Re-
tirement Sys. (No. 97-1732).
167. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the issue, the
case was ultimately passed over by an equally divided court that merely affirmed
the Seventh Circuit's decision. See California Pub. Employee's Retirement Sys. v.
Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (per curiam).
168. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874.
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denied the shareholders an appeal because they did not formally
intervene in the proceeding.169 In addition, the court extended the
intervention requirement to class action settlements by way of
dicta.170 The following two sections discuss each analysis
separately.
1. Non-Parties May Not Appeal from a Decision of Any Kind in
a Class Action
Before the Seventh Circuit examined the specific issue in ques-
tion-whether an unnamed shareholder may appeal the settle-
ment of a derivative suit-the court stated that unnamed class
members would have to intervene in the lower court to appeal in
class actions. 171 In its analysis of class actions, the court relied
primarily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ma-
rino v. Ortiz.' 72 To support its position, the Felzen court also ap-
plied a strict interpretation of the language in Rule 3(c) of the
169. See id. at 874-75. The shareholders contend that there was inadequate
time in which to intervene. See Brief for Petitioners at 8, California Pub. Employ-
ees' Retirement Sys. (No. 97-1732). Notice of the proposed settlement was sent to
all ADM shareholders on May 30, 1997. See id. at 7-8. July 3, 1997 was set as a
deadline for written objections, with a final hearing on July 7, 1997. See id. at 8.
The two shareholder petitioners, in their brief to the Supreme Court, emphasized
the fact that they:
had less than four weeks (once they actually recieved the notice) to review
the Settlement notice, hire counsel, obtain and review copies of pleadings
in the case weigh the fairness of the Settlement, draft a brief, and appear
in court in Decatur, Illinois. Moreover, plaintiffs did not file their volumi-
nous fee petition until June 30, 1997, leaving petitioners just four days to
gain access to, review, analyze, and respond in writing to that document
as well.
Id.
170. See Felzen 134 F.3d at 874-76. In the context of class actions, the decision
in Felzen overruled three prior Seventh Circuit decisions-Armstrong v. Board of
Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980); Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1976) and Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). See id.
at 875. In the context of derivative actions, the Seventh Circuit overruled Tryforos
v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975), a previous decision that allowed
unnamed, non-intervening shareholders to appeal. See id. at 874-76. The Felzen
court disagreed with the Third Circuit's position that unnamed shareholders had
standing to appeal a settlement. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 876 (disagreeing with the
Third Circuit's decision in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993)).
171. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75.
172. See id. at 874-76; see also Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (requiring
intervention for white police officers, who were not class members in the underly-
ing suit, in order to appeal from a consent decree).
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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 173 Significantly, no other
court, besides Marino, had mentioned the possibility that this rule
applied to the issue of appeals for unnamed parties.' 7 4 The three
judge panel also cited two recent Seventh Circuit opinions that re-
quired intervention for an appeal of a post-settlement order and
summary judgment in class action sUits. 175
The court expressly relied upon Marino. Judge Easterbrook
began the opinion with a quote from the Supreme Court's decision
in Marino, which states
"[tihe rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that prop-
erly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well
settled. The Court of Appeals suggested that there may be
exceptions to this general rule, primarily 'when the nonparty
has an interest that is affected by the trial court's judgment.'
We think the better practice is for such a nonparty to seek
intervention for purposes of appeal; denials of such motions
are, of course, appealable." 176
According to the court, Marino simply stated that if one is not
a party, one may not appeal. 177 Further, one is not considered a
party unless named in the suit. Therefore, a class member or
shareholder who is not a named party must become a named party
in order to appeal. 178 In addition, the Seventh Circuit supported
the intervention requirement by noting that a denial of a motion to
173. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874; Fed. R. App. P. 3(c); infra notes 182-89 and accom-
panying text.
174. See infra Part III.D. But see United States v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 51, 53-
55 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (utilizing Rule 3(c) to deny an appeal to a non-party who did not
intervene below).
175. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75. Although neither case is directly on point,
the court followed the rationale behind In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Anti-
trust Litig., 115 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1997), and In re VMS Limited Partnership Sec.
Litig., 976 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992). See infra Part I.A. In re Brand Name Pre-
scription Drugs involved unnamed class members' appeals from an order granting
summary judgment, while In re VMS Limited Partnership dealt with an appeal of
a post-settlement order confirming a sale of the defendant's property. See id. Both
of these cases followed and relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Marino. See
id.
176. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874 (quoting Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988)
(citations omitted)).
177. See id. In Marino, the Supreme Court denied an appeal by non-party
white police officers who challenged the settlement of a Title VII lawsuit between
black and hispanic police officers and the City of New York. Marino, 484 U.S. at
302-04.
178. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874.
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intervene is appealable. 179 Despite the appellants' attempts to dis-
tinguish the case law on which the Seventh Circuit rests its deci-
sion, the opinion stresses that Marino foreclosed all exceptions to
an unnamed party's right to appeal.' 80 Accordingly, the court al-
lows for no exceptions that could detract from Marino's reasoning:
a more liberal appeals procedure will disturb the manageability of
the class action.' 8 1
Additionally, the court sustains its position with a narrow
reading of Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.18 2
It provides, in pertinent part, that "[tihe notice of appeal shall
specify the party or parties taking the appeal ... ."183 Its purpose,
as implied by the Felzen court's interpretation of the rule, is to
limit appeals to named parties only.' 84 The court applies a "tex-
tual" interpretation of the language in Rule 3(c).' 8 5 The opinion
though, does not explain the rationale behind the assertion. 8 6 In-
stead, it cites Marino, where the Supreme Court refers to Rule 3(c)
in support of its assertion that only parties may appeal.'8 7 Thus,
similar to Marino's narrow reading of the rule, the Seventh Circuit
179. See id. at 874-75.
180. See id. at 875.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 874.
183. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) (emphasis added). Rule 3 is titled "Appeal as of
Right-How Taken." Fed. R. App. P. 3. Rule 3(c) is titled "Content of the Notice of
Appeal." Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). In full, Rule 3(c) states:
[tihe notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal;
shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from; and
shall name the court to which the appeal is taken. Form I in the Appen-
dix of Forms is a suggested form of a notice of appeal. An appeal shall not
be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal.
Id.
184. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75.
185. See id. This assertion is made based on the content of Rule 3. Rule 3(c)
involves the content of the notice of appeal, and states, in pertinent part, that
"[tihe notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal." Fed. R.
App. P. 3(c). It does not explain the precise definition of "party," nor does it explain
how the word "specify" shall be construed. Thus, the court applies a strict, textual
interpretation of party as a person whose name is contained on record as plaintiff
or defendant. See also infra Part III.D (providing further analysis of the court's
interpretation of Rule 3(c)).
186. The Felzen opinion cites the rule four times without providing an explana-
tion of why it is interpreted in such a manner. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75.
187. See id. at 874.
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also limits its meaning of "party" to a formal party to the record. '8 8
In essence, the Seventh Circuit contends that Rule 3(c) excludes
appeals by both unnamed class members and unnamed sharehold-
ers who do not intervene.' 8 9
Finally, the Felzen court cites two recent cases in the circuit
that require intervention. 190 In two post-Marino cases, In re
Brand Name Prescription Drugs'91 and In re VMS Limited Part-
nership,'19 2 the Seventh Circuit held that unnamed class members
must intervene to preserve a right to appeal.193 Although both
cases are distinguishable from the derivative suit settlement ap-
peal in Felzen (In re VMS Limited Partnership involved an appeal
of a post-settlement order and In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs dealt with an appeal of summary judgment), the court found
these distinctions insignificant in light of the rationale behind the
intervention requirement.194 The court stated that:
the distinction [was] inconsequential for purposes of Rule
3(c), the rationale of Marino, and the rationale of Brand
Name Prescription Drugs: that the court should not "frag-
ment the control of the class action" by allowing class mem-
bers to usurp the role of the class representative without
persuading the district judge that the representative is unfit
or unfaithful, or that subclasses should be created.' 9 5
This authority, according to the court, mandates that only named
parties may appeal because an unlimited right to appeal for all un-
named members will destroy the control of the class.
188. Compare Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301-04 (1988) (applying Rule 3(c) to
appeals by non-parties), with Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75 (regarding an identical
application of Rule 3(c), notwithstanding the fact that Marino involved an appeal
by outside persons who were not even members of the plaintiff class).
189. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75. The petitioners, California Public Employ-
ees' Retirement System, disagreed with the court's application of Rule 3(c) by argu-
ing that the title of Rule 3(c), "Content of the Notice of Appeal," suggests that the
rule is concerned with the formal contents of the appeal and not the status of par-
ticular parties who may seek review. See Brief for Petitioners at 12, 28-29, Califor-
nia Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732).
190. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75.
191. 115 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1997); see supra Part I.A.
192. 976 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992); see supra Part I.A.
193. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75.
194. Id. Under the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Marino, the crucial
question is whether the appeal is by a named party. Thus, the distinctions in In re
Brand Name Prescription Drugs and In re VMS Ltd. Partnership-the nature of
the order appealed from-are of no consequence.
195. Id. at 875 (quoting In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 115 F.3d at 457).
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In both cases, the Seventh Circuit required intervention, rea-
soning that it enhanced the manageability of a large class of liti-
gants by reducing the number of appeals by unnamed class
members. 196 For example, in In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs and In re VMS Limited Partnership, the Seventh Circuit de-
nied an appeal to unnamed class members because of concerns re-
garding its effect on a class' manageability. 197 Additionally, other
alternatives exist: class members may opt-out, make a request for
subclasses, or seek to replace the class representative. 198 In con-
trast, Marino's rationale is implied. The opinion does not clearly
illustrate the reasoning behind the intervention rule except for the
court's assertion that it is "the better practice."199
Ultimately, the court in Felzen extinguished all possible excep-
tions to the intervention requirement in the context of class ac-
tions.200 The court found it necessary to declare the law as it
applied to class actions, even before it decided the appellate rights
of the two shareholders in a derivative suit. Thus, the Seventh
Circuit had "formally overrule[d] ... any other case in [the] circuit
that permits non-parties to appeal from a decision of any kind in a
class action."201
2. Non-Party Shareholders May Not Appeal from a Decision of
Any Kind in a Derivative Suit
Does the intervention requirement apply equally to sharehold-
ers in derivative actions? The court finally sought to answer the
question at hand-whether "a shareholders' derivative action
under Rule 23.1 [is] different from a class action under Rule 23 in a
way that permits appeal by non-parties[.]" 20 2 In its analysis, the
court highlights three points. First, the court found that the appel-
lants' supporting authority was no match for Marino, the control-
196. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 115 F.2d at 457-58; In re VMS Ltd.
Partnership, 976 F.3d at 367-69.
197. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 115 F.3d at 457-58; In re VMS Ltd.
Partnership, 976 F.2d at 367-69. Presumably, a fewer number of unnamed mem-
bers would appeal in light of the burdens associated with intervention.
198. See id.
199. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988).
200. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
201, Id.
202. Id.
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ling Supreme Court precedent. 20 3 Second, some important
distinctions between derivative suits and class actions revealed
that shareholders in a derivative suit have less of a right to appeal
than class members.20 4 Third, notwithstanding the shareholders'
dissatisfaction with the particular settlement, as well as the gener-
ally recognized problems with settlements in class actions and de-
rivative suits, the court could not properly address this issue
because the shareholders failed to become named parties.2
0 5
As a preliminary matter, the court distinguished the appel-
lants' supporting Seventh Circuit precedent. 20 6 The appellants re-
lied on Tryforos v. Icarian Development Co. ,207 an earlier Seventh
Circuit decision that involved an appeal of a fee judgment in a
shareholders' derivative suit.2 0 8 In Tryforos, the Seventh Circuit
allowed the objecting shareholder to appeal without becoming a
formal party.209 In particular, the Felzen court criticized Tryforos
because it did not involve the question at hand in Felzen.210 Addi-
tionally, although the Tryforos court stated that a non-intervening,
unnamed shareholder was entitled to appeal a derivative suit set-
tlement, its supporting authority was unconvincing. 211 In fact, the
Felzen court explained that Tryforos boiled down to "an unex-
plained practice."212 The Felzen court's supporting authority is
203. See id. at 874-75; infra note 212 and accompanying text.
204. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
205:- See id. at 876. The court stated that "[the unnamed shareholders'] failure
to become parties prevents us from considering [the merits of the settlement]." Id.
206. See id. at 874.
207. 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975); see supra Part I.B.
208. Tryforos, 518 F.2d at 1260; see supra Part I.B.
209. Tryforos, 518 F.2d at 1263 & n.22; supra notes 123-25 and accompanying
text.
210. Tryforos considered whether an unnamed shareholder had complied with
the necessary requirements for filing objections to the proposed dismissal of a de-
rivative suit. Tryforos, 518 F.2d at 1260-64.
211. Without much analysis, Tryforos provides a footnote on the issue in
Felzen. Tryforos cites Cohen v. Young, and states that "[t]he law is clear that a
non-party shareholder who appears, pursuant to a Rule 23.1 notice, to present ob-
jections to a proposed dismissal or settlement of a derivative action may appeal an
adverse decision even though he has not been formally made a party to the action."
Id. at 1263 n.22 (citing Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942)). In
addition, Tryforos cited Ackert v. Ausman, 217 F. Supp. 934, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
"an odd reference for a rule of appellate jurisdiction." Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874.
212. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874. Specifically, the court stated that "[a]n unex-
plained practice does not offer shelter from a later opinion of the Supreme Court
holding that only parties may appeal .... " Id.
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equally unpersuasive; it applied class action precedent that did not
involve the appellate rights of unnamed shareholders in derivative
litigation.213
Next, the court sought to distinguish between class actions
and derivative suits.214 Under this approach, 21 5 the Seventh Cir-
cuit determined that a shareholder in a derivative action should
not be treated differently from a class member so as to entitle the
former to an appeal.216 Of course, the court identified various dif-
ferences between the class and derivative action.217 But, as a re-
sult of its analysis, the court found that "shareholders have the
weaker claim."218 Thus, the Felzen court concluded that since un-
named class members must intervene, so too must unnamed
shareholders in derivative actions.219
One difference between the class and derivative action, ex-
plained the court, is the injured party's identity.220 As a prerequi-
site to a class action, each member of the class has an injury that is
"typical" of the claims of the whole. 221 Furthermore, since all inju-
ries within the class are alike, "which injured persons become the
representatives, and which the 'mere' class members, is to a degree
fortuitous and to a degree dependent on the entrepreneurial activ-
ity of the class counsel."222 Primarily, "[ilt is the fact that each
class member has a real grievance with the defendant that sets up
at least an equitable argument for a class member who wants to
appeal."22 3
In contrast, the court asserted that a shareholder in a deriva-
tive action is not injured per se.224 In a derivative suit, an action is
213. See infra Part III.D.
214. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875-76.
215. Virtually all of the case law on the issue shows that derivative and class
actions have been treated synonymously throughout history. See supra Part I.
216. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
217. See id. at 875-76.
218. Id. at 876.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 875.
221. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
222. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
223. Id.
224. "Because a derivative action is brought by a shareholder on behalf of the
corporation, the corporation must have suffered the injury that is the basis of the
action." 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.1.02[3][b]. Nevertheless, the individual
shareholder is adversely affected by the injury to the corporation because he or she
owns shares in the corporation. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.1.02[31 [b].
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brought by an investor on behalf of the corporation because it is
the corporation that has suffered the injury.225 Procedurally, the
suit is filed by a representative of the shareholders only when the
corporation has refused to bring the suit in its own name.226 Con-
sequently, since the individual shareholders are not directly in-
jured and thus, not entitled to litigate, the court concludes that
unnamed shareholders should not be afforded party status.227
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit notes that class and derivative
actions differ in terms of who is entitled to recover. 228 In a class
action where monetary relief is sought, each class member is enti-
tled to a portion of the aggregate recovery depending on the extent
of injury and method for quantifying damages. 229 If injunctive or
declaratory relief is sought, class representatives or subclasses
may acquire the remedy on behalf of the whole class. 230 In either
situation, each individual class member may be entitled to com-
pensation.23 ' But in a derivative action, the corporation obtains
relief. The Felzen court noted that "[a] derivative suit is brought
by an investor in the corporation's (not the investor's) right to re-
cover for injury to the corporation."23 2 The named plaintiffs
merely "stand in the place of the corporation."233 In other words,
225. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875; Charles Hansen, A Guide to the American
Law Institute Corporate Governance Project 105 (Roger Clegg ed., 1995). "A deriv-
ative action differs from a class action in that a derivative action is brought on
behalf of the entity in which the shareholders, as a class, have an interest, while a
class action is brought on behalf of the class itself." 5 Moore, supra note 22,
§ 23.1.0215].
226. See 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.1.02; see also Frank v. Hadesman &
Frank, Inc., 83 F.3d 158, 160 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that before the action is
commenced, the shareholder must make a demand on the board of directors to
bring suit in the corporation's name).
227. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875 (citing Frank, 83 F.3d at 160) (asserting that
"loInce the [derivative] suit [is] filed, the court would treat it much like a class
action..." because the shareholder is a representative for all other investors). For
a thorough discussion on the nature of the derivative suit and its resemblance to
the class action, see Ballantine, supra note 111, §145, at 340-45. Indeed, other
distinctions exist that are crucial to the issue. See infra Part III.A.
228. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
229. See Newberg, supra note 4, §10.01, at 10-2.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875 (citation omitted).
233. 5 Moore, supra note 22, § 23.1.0213][c].
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since the alleged harm is to the corporation, it is the corporation
that is entitled to any recovery. 234
The court also asserts that in derivative suits it is the corpora-
tion, acting through its directors, that holds and controls any legal
claim. 235 In fact, the corporation's directors are primarily respon-
sible for the shareholders' investments-they "affect the interests
of stockholders without notifying them or obtaining their consent;
by investing in stock, they placed their funds at the management's
disposal and obtained, in exchange, the right to choose future man-
agers."236 Therefore, shareholders in derivative litigation should
not be treated as parties if they do not intervene, especially consid-
ering that their citizenship is ignored for diversity jurisdiction pur-
poses 23 7 and they are unable to opt out of the litigation.2 38
Finally, the court briefly addresses the issue of settlements.
In essence, the objecting shareholders opposed the settlement be-
cause it provided little monetary relief to the corporation in rela-
tion to the attorneys' fees239 and the proposed reforms in corporate
governance were deemed "valueless."240 The court ignored these
claims and disapproved of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger.241 In Bell
Atlantic Corp., the Third Circuit allowed an appeal to a non-inter-
vening shareholder because of the prevalence of collusive and un-
fair settlements in derivative litigation.242 The Bell-Atlantic Corp.
court focused on various "risks" in representative litigation that
234. See Hansen, supra note 225, at 105. This fumdamental difference between
derivative and class actions is plain when comparing "direct actions" to "derivative
actions." A direct action exists when the plaintiff-shareholder ignores the demand
requirement and pleads specifically that he or she has suffered a direct injury. See
id. at 107, 129. Thus, in a direct action, any recovery inures to the plaintiff-share-
holder directly. See id. at 129.
235. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875-76.
236. Id. at 875.
237. See id. (citing Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957)).
238. See id.; see also infra Part III (analyzing the effects of a shareholder's in-
ability to opt out in derivative litigation).
239. See Brief for Petitioners at 6-7, California Pub. Employees' Retirement
Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732). Under the settlement, the
"plaintiffs' attorneys agreed to release 'any and all causes of action' against ADM
and the director defendants in return for $8 million-just 3.2 percent of the $250
million in claimed damages and less than 4.3 percent of the $190 million ADM
paid in fines and compensation to the government and competitors." Id. at 6.
240. Id. at 7.
241. 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993); supra Part ILB.
242. Bell At. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1304-10.
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often affect the fairness of settlements. 243 But the court in Felzen
did not respond to the Third Circuit's concerns regarding fairness
of settlements in derivative suits. 244 Rather, it noted that deriva-
tive actions are generally harmful to the corporation because they
"do little to promote sound management and often hurt the firm by
diverting the managers' time from running the business while di-
verting the firm's resources to the plaintiffs' lawyers .... "245
While ample evidence supports this proposition, 246 the court failed
to address the problems of the settlement process in derivative ac-
tions. Instead, the court disposed of the settlement issue because
"[the objectors'] failure to become parties prevent[ed] [the court]
from considering this contention .... ,"247 In sum, the three judge
panel felt it inappropriate to consider the fairness of the settlement
because the objecting shareholders were not formal parties to the
litigation.
The Seventh Circuit left no exceptions for the hopeful objector
who is not a formal party. According to the court, Marino and Rule
3(c) treat nonparty shareholders and unnamed class members
identically-when neither is a formal party to the record, there is
no right to appeal without intervention. 248 Furthermore, differ-
ences between a class and derivative action indicate that a non-
party shareholder has an even weaker argument in terms of a
right to appeal.249 As a result, the Seventh Circuit shut the door
on two disgruntled shareholders without addressing the probable
243. Id. at 1309-10. For example, the Bell Atlantic court noted that sharehold-
ers' monitoring problems often lead to instances where plaintiffs' counsel and de-
fendants collude to provide substantial settlement benefits for themselves, while
slighting the interests of the corporation and shareholders. Id. at 1310; see also
infra Part ILE (discussing incentives of plaintiffs' council and defendants that
conflict with the interests of the corporation and unnamed shareholders).
244. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 876. The problem with Bell Atlantic Corp., in the view
of the Felzen court, is that "[the Third Circuit conceived of the question as
whether the shareholder has standing, which is misleading." Id. The court went
on to state that "[eiquating injury with party status is exactly the approach disap-
proved by Marino." Id. The court reasoned that because a shareholder is harmed
by a reduction of his stock's market price, this fact does not necessarily confer
party status because "[named] [p]arties are a subset of injured persons." Id.
245. Id. (citing Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Set-
tlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1991)).
246. See Reinier Kraakman et al., When are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder
Interests?, 82 Geo. L.J. 1733, 1733-45 (1994).
247. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 876.
248. See id. at 875.
249. See id. at 876.
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inadequacies of an $8 million settlement. Ultimately, the United
States Supreme Court did little to resolve the issue when it af-
firmed the Seventh Circuit's decision by an equally divided court.
III. UNNAMED SHAREHOLDERS IN DERIVATIVE SUITS DESERVE
GREATER APPELLATE RIGHTS
Unnamed shareholders in derivative actions should be allowed
to appeal from a court's settlement approval without the added
procedural step of intervention. This premise contrasts the Sev-
enth Circuit's analysis in Felzen, where the court concluded that,
as compared with class members' right to appeal, "shareholders [in
derivative actions] have the weaker claim."250 Shareholders in de-
rivative actions should be entitled to a more flexible appellate pro-
cess than class members in class actions. Thus, the intervention
requirement, as it applies to an unnamed shareholder's appeal in
derivative litigation, is an impediment that will ultimately con-
sume both the benefits of derivative litigation and shareholders'
rights in protecting their ownership interests.
The argument against requiring intervention in derivative liti-
gation appeals is persuasive for several reasons. First, Felzen was
wrongly decided by the Seventh Circuit. The court's analysis,
though, was not entirely awry-unlike other courts that had con-
fronted the issue of an unnamed party's right to appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit acknowledged that the class action and derivative suit
each deserved independent analyses. 25 ' However, the court's ex-
amination of class action and derivative suits overlooked impor-
tant distinctions demonstrating that unnamed shareholders in
derivative actions have a stronger argument than class members
in terms of a right to appeal. 25 2 As a result, the court's conclusion
rests only on the strict and unyielding proposition that only named
parties may appeal.
Second, policy considerations weigh in favor of protecting cor-
porations and investors. The desire for corporate efficiency neces-
sitates legal rules that maximize the benefits to and from
corporations, minimize agency costs and deter managerial
breaches of fiduciary duties. In this context, the derivative suit's
250. Id.
251. See id. at 874-76.
252. See infra Part III.C.
DERIVATIVE-SUIT APPEALS
role is significant, primarily because it deters corporate directors
from considering unlawful governing practices. Considering these
theories, an intervention requirement ultimately prevents what is
good for corporations and shareholders.
Third, the legal rules governing the derivative suit support the
argument that unnamed shareholders in derivative litigation
should be allowed to appeal without intervention. Unlike the pro-
visions for class actions in Rule 23, Rule 23.1 does not allow share-
holders to opt out of a derivative suit. Thus, a final judgment in
derivative litigation, whether favorable or not, binds all sharehold-
ers. This consequence is particularly troublesome because deriva-
tive suits are often pursued not by aggrieved shareholders, but by
plaintiffs' attorneys who have strong economic incentives to obtain
a small recovery for the corporation and shareholders in exchange
for a large award of attorneys' fees.253 Therefore, a less rigorous
procedure for appeals in derivative actions is necessary consider-
ing both the nature of the derivative suit and the inadequate pro-
tection provided to shareholders in Rule 23.1.
Fourth, there is no precedent that supports the intervention
requirement in derivative suits. Since the intervention require-
ment was recognized in 1987, courts have been consistent in apply-
ing it in the class action context, reasoning that a lack of such a
requirement would effectively destroy the manageability of the
class. In addition, supporters of the intervention requirement
point to other available alternatives to class members who disa-
gree with various decisions by the named plaintiffs' attorneys. 254
Under these rationales, though, the intervention requirement
should not apply to derivative suits because the purpose of the de-
rivative action-to provide legal redress to the corporation-is
achieved when unnamed shareholders are not restricted in their
attempts to appeal unfair settlements. Thus, the precedent sup-
porting the intervention requirement in class actions does not ap-
ply to derivative suits.
Finally, there are unique risks present in the context of deriv-
ative-suit settlements. Primarily, economic incentives for plain-
tiffs' attorneys and defendants lead to collusive settlements-both
sides collaborate in order to maximize the benefits to each other,
253. See William Klein & John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Fi-
nance 196 (6th ed. 1996).
254. See supra Part II.A.
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neglecting the interests of the aggrieved shareholders and corpora-
tion.255 Adding to this abuse, in derivative suits, the litigation ex-
penses are passed on to and paid by the corporation. 256 Indeed, an
intervention requirement obstructs the shareholders' efforts to en-
sure that the benefits of suit accrue to the corporation and share-
holders and not to ravenous plaintiffs' attorneys and blameworthy
defendants. Accordingly, the intervention requirement increases
the likelihood of unfair settlements; this result is especially inequi-
table in meritorious derivative actions.
A. Critiquing the Seventh Circuit's Decision in Felzen
The court advances several reasons why unnamed sharehold-
ers in derivative actions have a weaker argument for appeal than
class members. First, the court compares the general characteris-
tics of the class action and derivative suit. In class actions, ex-
plained the court, each class member has an individual injury and
claim against the defendant. It then contrasted the derivative
suit, where an investor is not directly injured and thus, not allowed
to litigate individually. 257 This reason, argues the court, "sets up
at least an equitable argument for a class member who wants to
appeal."258
Basically, the court asks this question: Why should unnamed
shareholders in a derivative action be able to appeal when they are
not (1) entitled to litigate individually, (2) directly injured and. (3)
allowed to directly recover?259 In its answer, the court relies on
the distinction between direct and derivative actions-class mem-
bers who sue directly have a stronger argument for an appeal than
shareholders who sue derivatively.
In terms of an unnamed shareholder's right to appeal, the
court's analysis is unconvincing. The purpose of the derivative suit
is to recover for harm to the corporation when those who control
the corporation, the directors, are unwilling to proceed with the
action. Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, the purpose of
the derivative action "was to place in the hands of the individual
shareholder a means to protect the interests of the corporation
255. See infra Part III.E.
256. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 253, at 196.
257. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998).
258. Id.
259. See id.
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from the misfeasance and malfeasance of 'faithless directors and
managers.'"260 Therefore, the individual shareholder is entitled to
litigate when "the corporation itself ha[s] refused to proceed after
suitable demand .. .. "261 A shareholder suing derivatively pur-
sues relief directly for the corporation and indirectly for its share-
holders collectively.262 Indeed, since the shareholders bring the
suit on behalf of the corporation, the shareholders have a duty to
contest an inequitable judgment. The intervention requirement
works the opposite result-it impairs shareholders' abilities to pro-
tect the interests of the corporation.
Another difference between class and derivative actions is the
recovery of damages. The Seventh Circuit notes that, unlike class
actions, in derivative actions the corporation receives the damages
award.263 Thus, when the injury is derivative, shareholders indi-
rectly reap the benefits which inure directly to the corporation. 26 4
Again, as a matter of theory, any recovery does belong to the corpo-
ration. But for the purposes of appeals, shareholders have a legiti-
mate ownership interest at stake-an interest that justifies a right
to appeal an adverse judgment on the corporation's behalf. After
all, "itihe participants most directly affected by injury inflicted on
the firm are the stockholders-for their investment is first to be
wiped out."265 So long as the appealing shareholders are initiating
a challenge on behalf of the corporation as a whole, they should
have standing to appeal without becoming a named party.
To further support its decision, the court gives additional rea-
sons why "it [is not] surprising that stockholders other than the
260, Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (quoting Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)).
261. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970). The demand requirement is
embodied in Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made
by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors
or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or mem-
bers, and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for
not making the effort.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
262. Since the corporation directly recovers, shareholders are said to indirectly
recover by an increase in the value of their stock. See Ballantine, supra note 227,
§ 120, at 290.
263. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
264. See Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1335-
36 (7th Cir. 1989).
265. Id. at 1336.
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named plaintiffs are not treated as parties in derivative litigation
....- 266 First, when determining diversity for jurisdictional pur-
poses, courts ignore the citizenship of unnamed shareholders. 26 7
Notwithstanding the fact that unnamed shareholders are not
treated as parties for determinations of diversity jurisdiction, un-
named shareholders should still be entitled to appeal because their
rights are necessarily affected by a court's judgment.
Similarly, the court states that unnamed shareholders in de-
rivative actions are not treated as parties because they are not al-
lowed to opt out.268 But in contrast to the court's analysis, this fact
should afford unnamed shareholders a right to appeal without in-
tervention because they have no choice but to bind themselves to
the court's judgment. Like the interests of the named plaintiff-
shareholders, who may appeal without intervention, the unnamed
shareholders' interests in derivative litigation are equally affected.
Named plaintiffs do not have more at stake-the fact that the suit
is brought derivatively means that the corporation and all share-
holders are affected as a whole. 26 9
The identity of the named plaintiff usually means relatively
little; a derivative action "is typically brought by a plaintiffs attor-
ney who finds a shareholder, who may own only a few shares, to
serve as the nominal plaintiff."270 Because the named plaintiffs
identity in derivative actions is a mere formality,271 there should
be no difference between the appellate rights of named and un-
named shareholders in derivative litigation. Furthermore, since
unnamed shareholders in derivative actions are bound by the liti-
266. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
267. See id. at 875-76 (citing Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957)).
268. See id.; see also infra Part III.C (discussing the significance of sharehold-
ers' inability to opt out).
269. See Frank v. Hadesman & Frank, Inc., 83 F.3d 158, 160 (7th Cir. 1996).
270. Klein & Coffee, supra note 253, at 196. The court in Felzen recognizes this
reality in the context of class actions. "All class members are identical in entitle-
ment to litigate; which injured persons become the representatives, and which the
'mere' class members, is to a degree fortuitous and to a degree dependent on the
entrepreneurial activity of the class counsel." Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875. Most com-
mentators on the subject agree that it applies in derivative suits as well. See, e.g.,
Klein & Coffee, supra note 253, at 196.
271. See Peter C. Kostant, Recent Development, Corporations-Second Circuit
Refuses to Allow Layman to Prosecute Derivative Action Pro Se, 45 Fordham L.
Rev. 1534, 1539 (1977) (explaining the role of the plaintiff in a derivative suit, in
the words of Justice Jackson, as "a self-chosen representative and a volunteer
champion").
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gation decisions of the named plaintiffs' attorneys, and ultimately,
a court's final judgment (because they cannot opt out), unnamed
shareholders should have an opportunity to appeal without the ad-
ded step of intervention.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit overstates a hypothetical that
equates the appellate rights of shareholders with the appellate
rights of third parties who may have contractual interests with the
corporation.272 This conclusion rests on the idea that corporations
are nothing but a "nexus of contracts."273 Under this theory,
shareholders have mere contractual interests because when share-
holders buy stock in the corporation, they have entered into an im-
plied contract.274 Again, such a contractual hypothesis can be
supported in theory; however, this conclusion is not in line with the
law. Shareholders may sue derivatively because they, as "benefi-
cial owners," become entitled to pursue relief on behalf of the cor-
poration. 275 Moreover, unlike shareholders, contractually related
third parties are not entitled to any residuary interest.276
In sum, the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Felzen errs in two
major ways. First, as a result of its comparison of class actions and
derivative suits, the court wrongly decides that unnamed share-
holders in derivative actions have a weaker claim to an appeal
than class members in class actions. For the reasons previously
stated, shareholders in derivative suits have at least an equal ar-
gument. The Seventh Circuit, though, came to the opposite conclu-
sion. The court initially finds that intervention is required for
272. The hypothetical, in addition to the court's response, states:
Suppose the settlement of a derivative action induces the corporation to
fire its CEO, or to curtail its purchases of fax machines, or to choose a
different law firm. The affected employees, vendors, and lawyers could
not appeal just because they believed the settlement improvident or the
judge's action in approving it legally erroneous. Only parties may appeal.
So too with shareholders, who have no more right to speak for the firm or
control its litigation decisions than bondholders or banks or landlords, all
of whom have contractual interests that may be affected by litigation.
Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874.
273. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 12 (1991).
274. See id. This contract is a voluntary arrangement where the shareholders
know little about the terms of the agreement-these rules are made by investment
banks and managers, and are only subject to change through voting. See id. at 15-
16.
275. Ballantine, supra note 227, § 119, at 289.
276. See Ballantine, supra note 227, § 117, at 289.
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unnamed class members. Then, after comparing class and deriva-
tive actions, it bootstraps the intervention requirement to deriva-
tive actions because in its view, shareholders in derivative actions
have less of a right to appeal than class members. The following
discussion will assert various reasons why the court's finding is er-
roneous-unnamed shareholders in derivative actions have a
stronger argument in terms of a right to appeal.
Second, the court's analysis adheres to an overly strict applica-
tion of the term "party." According to the court, unnamed share-
holders in derivative actions are not parties in the context of a
right to appeal because (1) they are not parties for purposes of di-
versity determinations and (2) they are not parties since they may
not opt out.277 This rationale ignores the issue at hand-whether
unnamed shareholders should have a right, without having to for-
mally intervene, to protect their investments by appealing collu-
sive settlements.
B. The Benefits of the Corporation and Derivative Suit
Corporations are accountable for our "big business."278 In fact,
corporations hold a significant part of this country's assets and, in
addition, direct a large part of our country's new investments. 279
Hence, corporate efficiency necessarily leads to a flourishing
economy.28 0
On a smaller scale, individual shareholders benefit from pro-
ductive corporate activity in much of the same way. When a corpo-
ration acts efficiently, both the value of the company and the value
of shareholders' stock increase.28' One simple example of the per-
ceived benefits derived from corporations occurred early in the
twentieth century, when Delaware purposely enacted laws that
277. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
278. Klein & Coffee, supra note 253, at 104.
279. See Jeffrey Michael Smith, Note, The Role of the Attorney in Protecting
(and Impairing) Shareholder Interests: Incentives and Disincentives to Maximize
Corporate Wealth, 47 Duke L.J. 161, 163-64 (1997).
280. Best described by Judge Richard Posner's approach to the law, principles
of efficiency "refer to a situation in which aggregate net benefits (the 'size of the
pie,' to use the economists' metaphor) are as large as possible." George M. Cohen,
Comment, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from
the Bench, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1125-27 (1985). This idea of efficiency is ad-
vanced when wealth is maximized and when the benefits of a given policy out-
weigh the costs. See id.
281. See id.
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would encourage more corporate charters in the state. 28 2 In realiz-
ing the substantial benefits of corporate activity, Delaware became
the champion of American corporations. 283 Accordingly, when cor-
porations are efficient, they produce obvious benefits on an individ-
ual, state and national level.
As a "chief regulator of corporate management,"28 4 the deriva-
tive suit plays a large role in effectuating corporate efficiency. 28 5
Although some question the utility of derivative suits, this criti-
cism stems from the fact that derivative suits are often abused by
self-interested plaintiffs' lawyers. 28 6 But when viewed as a mecha-
nism of corporate accountability, 28 7 derivative actions influence di-
rectors to adhere to fiduciary duties and protect shareholders'
interests.288 In fact, derivative suits may increase the value of cor-
porations in two ways. First, the possibility of such a suit may act
as a deterrent to directors' improper conduct. Second, the suit's
ultimate recovery for, may exceed the costs to, the corporation.28 9
Therefore, with the resulting benefits of derivative actions in mind,
individuals are encouraged to invest in corporations because they
are confident in their investments and trust the directors who pro-
tect and advance their interests.
The benefits of corporate efficiency and the utility of derivative
suits are directly correlated to the issue of unnamed shareholders'
rights to appeal in derivative actions. A move toward these ideals
is possible only when shareholders are able to adequately monitor
and protect their interests. To the contrary, a procedural barrier
282. See, e.g., Alexander G. Simpson, Shareholder Voting and the Chicago
School: Now is the Winter of our Discontent, 43 Duke L.J. 189, 196-97 (1993).
283. See id.
284. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
285. Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg discusses the relationship between the law,
social norms, and corporate efficiency. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law,
Social Norms, and Belief Systems 35 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(contending that "whatever the law does to increase the force of the social norm of
loyalty, and further its internalization, will lead to greater efficiency and will
therefore benefit shareholders as a class. Whatever the law does to diminish the
force of the social norm of loyalty, and lessen its internalization, will have the op-
posite effect").
286. See, e.g., Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the
Derivative Suit and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 355,,357-58
(1994).
287. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 253, at 176.
288. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 253, at 176.
289. See Kraakman, supra note 246, at 1736.
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such as the intervention requirement works an opposite result. By
mandating intervention for unnamed shareholders in derivative
litigation, courts make it more difficult for those attempting to
safeguard their own interests and the interests of the corporation.
Thus, if unnamed shareholders can appeal unfavorable judgments
in derivative actions, without the added step of intervention, then
they can monitor and protect individual and corporate interests.
In addition, shareholders will then be able to advance the greater
good of corporate efficiency.
C. The Derivative Suit and Rule 23.1 Command Greater
Protection for Shareholders
Until Felzen, no court had actually used separate analyses for
derivative suits and class actions. Remarkably, most courts have
continually disregarded the fact that both rules offer distinctly op-
posite protective mechanisms in terms of an unnamed party's right
to appeal. In short, while Rule 23 assures that unnamed class
members are adequately protected, Rule 23.1 does very little to
protect the appellate rights of unnamed shareholders in derivative
litigation.
An examination of both rules evidences a need to provide a
more liberal appellate procedure to unnamed shareholders in de-
rivative actions. For example, unnamed class members have the
ability to opt out of certain types of class actions. 290 Rule 23.1,
though, does not allow shareholders to opt out of derivative
suits. 29 1 In addition, Rule 23 mandates that the court make an
affirmative determination, before the suit is even certified as a
class action, that the named plaintiff for the class will adequately
protect and represent the interests of the whole class.2 92 In com-
parison, Rule 23.1 does not provide such protection.293 In short,
unnamed shareholders should be afforded a more liberal right to
appeal because Rule 23.1 does not adequately protect their rights
as represented litigants in the context of appeals.
290. The ability to opt out is available only in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (providing class members
with notice and the choice of opting out of the suit).
291. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993).
292. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see also Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1011 (explaining
the greater protective mechanisms provided for class members in the text of Rule
23).
293. See infra notes 293-306 and accompanying text.
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In reference to the issue of unnamed party appeals, Rule 23.1
does not assure adequate protection to represented shareholders.
One provision in the rule protects shareholders' interests by man-
dating that each unnamed shareholder receive notice of, and an
opportunity to object to, the court's proposed order. 294 Accordingly,
unnamed shareholders are afforded only one procedural mecha-
nism to protect their legal rights. An even more troubling aspect,
however, is the fact that this protective measure only affords un-
named shareholders a right to object. In other words, if unnamed
shareholders are unable to appeal without intervention, they may
be left with no remedy if the court ultimately discards their
objections.295
This adverse consequence is even more troublesome consider-
ing that shareholders cannot opt out of derivative suits.296 The
Tenth Circuit, in Gottlieb v. Wiles,297 recognized the importance of
a shareholder's inability to opt out because "all shareholders [will
be] bound by the outcome [of the suit] regardless of their objec-
tions."298 In Gottlieb, the court held that unnamed class members
could not appeal unless they have been granted intervenor status
by the court, or unless a violation of Rule 23 procedure has oc-
curred.299 More importantly though, the court explicitly stated
that "[rlule 23.1 does not offer the same protective mechanisms of-
fered by Rule 23."300 Thus, the Tenth Circuit implies that a differ-
ent outcome may be warranted in light of a shareholder's inability
to opt out in derivative litigation.301 Indeed, other courts have also
294. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1; supra note 112. Rule 23 provides the same protec-
tive mechanism for class actions arising under subsection (b)(3). See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23; supra note 36.
295. Many commentators agree that courts are not inclined to carefully con-
sider shareholder objections, a consequence that will ultimately nullify the benefit
of this protective mechanism. See, e.g., Elliot 1. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let
the Money do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors can Reduce Agency Costs
in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053, 2066-71 (1995).
296. One reason that shareholders may not opt is because derivative suits often
end in settlements, where the parties agree to an improved plan of corporate gov-
ernance. See Tower C. Snow, Jr. et al., The Settlement of Class and Derivative
Claims, 958 PLI/Corp 1105, 1120 (1996). If opt outs were allowed, implementing
changes in corporate governance would be virtually impossible. See id.
297. 11 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 1993).
298. Id. at 1011.
299. Id. at 1012.
300. Id. at 1011.
301. See id.
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recognized that unnamed shareholders in derivative suits may de-
serve a more flexible appellate procedure because Rule 23.1 denies
them the possibility of opting out in derivative actions.30 2
Another deficient protective device embodied in Rule 23.1 is
the "adequacy of representation" provision. The rule explicitly
states that "[tihe derivative action may not be maintained if it ap-
pears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in
enforcing the right of the corporation or association."30 3 This pro-
tection is especially insufficient when compared to the correspond-
ing provision for class actions in Rule 23.304
One problem with this provision in Rule 23.1, as opposed to
Rule 23, is that the court is never required to make a positive de-
termination that the named plaintiff adequately represents the in-
terests of the corporation and unnamed shareholders 305-instead,
the court takes a back-seat and steps in only when it appears that
the named plaintiff is neglecting the collective interest of the cor-
poration and unnamed shareholders. This protective device's
weakness becomes more evident when the suit is in the settlement
stage. Scholars on the subject agree that judges, for various rea-
sons, are not well positioned to critically evaluate the fairness of a
302. The Tenth Circuit has restated the importance of a shareholder's inability
to opt out in derivative litigation. See Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439
(10th Cir. 1995). In Rosenbaum, the court allowed a non-intervening class mem-
ber to appeal only the attorneys' fees portion of a combined class and derivative
action. See id. at 1441-43. The court stated that this right applied even stronger
in the context of a derivative suit, partly because a shareholder may not opt out of
the action. See id. at 1443. The Third Circuit, in Bell Atlantic Corp., explained
that "one of the rationales offered in support of an intervention requirement can-
not apply to derivative actions. That is, unlike members of a class certified under
Rule 23(b)(3), 'shareholders normally cannot opt out of the class and pursue their
own individual action.'" Bell AtI. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1307-08 n.4 (3d Cir.
1993) (quoting American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Anal-
ysis and Recommendations § 7.02, at 635) (Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31, 1992)).
303. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1; supra note 112.
304. In comparison, Rule 23 mandates that the adequacy requirement be met
as a prerequisite to the class action suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); supra note
36.
305. The Tenth Circuit, in Gottlieb, stated that "[ulnlike class actions under
Rule 23, in shareholder derivative suits under Rule 23.1, a preliminary affirmative
determination that the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the other class members is not a prerequisite to the maintenance of the
action." Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993).
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particular settlement.30 6 For example, in Felzen, one questions the
plaintiffs' attorneys vigor in adequately protecting the sharehold-
ers' interests.
In the over two years the case was pending, there is no record
of either side issuing interrogatories, seeking or taking depo-
sitions, or propounding third-party subpoenas. Plaintiffs did
file a three-page motion to compel production of certain docu-
ments. But that motion was never ruled upon and plaintiffs
never pressed the issue.30 7
Certainly, if Rule 23.1 required the court to make an initial deter-
mination of adequate representation, the unnamed shareholders'
interests would receive better protection.
D. Precedent Does Not Support an Intervention Requirement in
Derivative Suits
In Felzen, the Seventh Circuit relies on three sources of au-
thority, each of which is inapplicable to the issue of an unnamed
shareholder's right to appeal in derivative litigation. First, the
court adheres to the Supreme Court's decision in Marino v. Or-
tiz.308 This case, however is distinguishable because it does not
involve the appellate rights of represented shareholders in deriva-
tive litigation.30 9 Second, the Seventh Circuit relies on Rule 3(c) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,3 10 which, of course, the
Supreme Court cited in Marino.3 11 Third, the Felzen court relies
on two prior class action cases in the circuit, requiring that un-
306. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 295, at 2066-71. Weiss and Becker-
man point to two main reasons for this proposition. See Weiss & Beckerman,
supra note 295, at 2066-71. First, the judge is not familiar with the circumstances
and evidence present in the case. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 295, at 266-
71. Second, judges are prone, in the interest ofjudicial economy, to encourage and
approve settlement negotiations. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 295, at 266-
71; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1993) (asserting
that informational constraints impede the full benefits of the adversarial process).
307. Brief for Petitioners at 6, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v.
Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732).
308. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 874-76 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Marino
v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988)).
309. See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304.
310. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75 (citing Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)).
311. See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304.
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named class members intervene in order to appeal.3 12 These class
action cases, like Marino, were decided on a line of reasoning that
does not apply to the issue of derivative actions in Felzen. In fact,
the Seventh Circuit failed to cite to any court that required inter-
vention in derivative actions. Instead, it merely disagreed with
one circuit that did not require such a procedure. 313
In essence, the Felzen court supports its holding with the
Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Marino. In Marino, white
police officers, who were not parties to the underlying action and
who had not attempted to intervene, were denied a right to appeal
a consent decree approving a settlement.314 Specifically, the
Supreme Court held that "because petitioners were not parties to
the underlying lawsuit, and because they failed to intervene for
purposes of appeal, they may not appeal from the consent decree
approving that lawsuit's settlement .... "315
Utilizing these words, the Seventh Circuit adopted a textual
interpretation of the term "party."316 In its view, the Supreme
Court held that the term "party" refers only to those named as
plaintiffs and defendants in the suit. Accordingly, because the two
312. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874 (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Anti-
trust Litig., 115 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1997) and In re VMS Ltd. Partnership Sec.
Litig., 976 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992)).
313. The court disagreed with the Third Circuit's decision to not require inter-
vention in derivative suits. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 876 (citing Bell At. Corp. v.
Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993)).
314. Marino, 484 U.S. at 304. In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, African-
American and Hispanic police officers alleged, under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, that New York City's officer promotion examination had a disparate
impact on the minority class. See Hispanic Soc'y. v. New York City Police Dep't.,
806 F.2d 1147, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986). The district court approved a settlement that
"called for the successive promotion of Blacks and Hispanics who had taken the
examination until the alleged disparate impact was eliminated." Id. White police
officers, who were not class members in the underlying suit, sought an appeal that
was eventually dismissed by the Second Circuit because the appellants were not
parties to the litigation. See id. at 1150-51. The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari and, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment of
the Second Circuit. See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304.
315. Marino, 484 U.S. at 304. The Court further stated that "[t]he rule that
only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an
adverse judgment, is well settled." Id. The opinion in Felzen begins with this quo-
tation. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874.
316. The Supreme Court cited to United States ex rel. Louisiana v. Jack, 244
U.S. 397, 402 (1917), which stands for the proposition that only a party of record
(named party) may appeal from a district court judgment. Id. at 304.
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appealing shareholders in Felzen were not named parties, they
were unable to appeal.
The case is inapplicable to an unnamed shareholder's right to
appeal a settlement in derivative litigation.317 In Marino, the ap-
pealing police officers were not even members of a class-they
were, at most, outsiders who were interested in the suit's outcome.
The Felzen court, however, did not explain why Marino pertained
to a derivative action.3 18 In fact, it is difficult to imagine how it
applies at all; unlike shareholders in derivative actions, the non-
party police officers in Marino are not represented parties, are not
entitled to receive notice of a court's proposed order and have no
right to present objections in the district court.319 Hence, the Sev-
enth Circuit's interpretation of Marino is untenable because the
legal rights of non-parties are so insignificant as compared with
the rights of shareholders.
In addition, the Felzen court relied on Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 3(c).320 The rule, entitled "Content of the Notice of
Appeal," states that "[tihe notice of appeal shall specify the party
or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or
part thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the
appeal is taken."32 1 Although the Seventh Circuit never explained
how the rule applies to shareholder appeals in derivative actions,
the court implies that since the notice of appeal shall specify the
party taking the appeal, only named parties may appeal, regard-
less of the circumstances. 322
The court's reliance on this rule is misplaced. Primarily, Rule
3, in its entirety, deals solely with the filing and form requirements
for appeals. 323 As the title of subsection three suggests ("Content
317. Other commentators agree that Marino does not apply because it involved
nonparties. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 31, at 942-43.
318. The court did state that factual distinctions were insignificant in light of
Marino's rationale. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875. The problem, however, is that
Marino's rationale is not explained in the Supreme Court's one page per curiam
opinion. Marino, 484 U.S. at 304.
319. As non-parties, the appellants in Marino are afforded none of the protec-
tions afforded to class members by Rule 23.
320. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75.
321. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c); see supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
322. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75.
323. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). Rule 3(c) also states that "[florm 1 in the Appen-
dix of Forms is a suggested form of a notice of appeal." Id. The rule's use of the
word "form" suggests that it is concerned only with the form of the written appeal.
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of the Notice of Appeal"), the rule does not purport to limit a court
of appeals' jurisdiction to only named parties. Rather, the rule sets
forth conventional and uniform requirements for written notices of
appeals.
Moreover, appellate courts have traditionally allowed non-par-
ties to appeal, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's current inter-
pretation of Rule 3(c). 32 4 Presumably, the Supreme Court, in
Marino, put this issue to rest when it cited Rule 3(c) for the propo-
sition that non-parties may never appeal.3 25 To the contrary, ap-
pellate courts have continued to allow appeals to non-parties
without even mentioning the applicability of Rule 3(c).3 26 As a con-
sequence, the Seventh Circuit seems to have misplaced Marino's
application of Rule 3(c).
Finally, the Seventh Circuit supports its decision in Felzen
with two class action cases in which the court required interven-
tion:3 27 In re VMS Limited Partnership Securities Litigation and In
re Brand Named Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation. Both
cases relied on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Guthrie v. Ev-
ans,3 28 the first of "the more recent cases" that required interven-
tion for unnamed class members in class actions.3 29 In short,
Guthrie's reasoning was based on three factors. First, unnamed
class members may not appeal because they have not been certified
as adequate representatives of the class. 330 Second, unnamed
class members, who disagree with a suit's course of action, have
alternative procedures such as opting out of the action. 331 Third,
allowing unnamed class members to appeal individually would
324. See SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass'n, 577 F.2d 600, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1978); see
also United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1974) (allowing appeal regarding
a denial of an order enjoining the media from publishing information in a criminal
trial); Overby v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1955)
(allowing non-party an appeal from a denial of a privilege claim).
325. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988).
326. See Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing a non-
party to appeal where the appellant participated in the lower court proceedings
and where the equities of the case favored an appeal). The Ninth Circuit explicitly
stated that Marino did not apply because the appellant in Keith was "haled into
[the) action by the district court over his objections." Id. at 1391 n.7.
327. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-76.
328. 815 F.2d 626 (11th Cir. 1987).
329. In re VMS Ltd. Partnership, 976 F.2d at 367-68.
330. See Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 628.
331. See id.
DERIVATIVE-SUIT APPEALS
frustrate the purpose of the class action because the action would
then become unmanageable.33 2
There are two main reasons why the Guthrie/ In re VMS Lim-
ited Partnership/ In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs trilogy
should not apply to the issue presented in Felzen. First, unlike
these three cases, Felzen involved a shareholder derivative suit.
As explained previously, similar treatment of class and derivative
actions is inappropriate-the rights of shareholders in derivative
actions are protected less adequately than the rights of class mem-
bers.333 Thus, unnamed shareholders in derivative actions de-
serve a more liberal appellate procedure.3 34
Second, at least two of the reasons in support of the interven-
tion requirement, as put forth in Guthrie, do not apply in the con-
text of derivative actions. Shareholders in derivative actions do not
have the alternative of opting out of the suit. Moreover, allowing
unnamed shareholders to appeal without intervention will not de-
feat the purpose of the derivative action. Rather, removing the ad-
ded procedural burden of the intervention requirement will further
the purpose of the derivative suit-"to place in the hands of the
individual shareholder a means to protect the interests of the cor-
poration. .. ."35 Thus, the Seventh Circuit erred when it relied on
the rationale of class action cases.
E. The Intervention Requirement Will Increase the Prevalence of
Unfair Settlements in Derivative Suits
The pervasiveness of unfair and collusive settlements in deriv-
ative litigation is well known. Adding to this problem is the fact
that the settlement rate in derivative actions is higher than in
other areas of civil litigation.33 6 Further, an even "greater problem
may be the tendency for even meritorious actions to result in collu-
sive settlements."337 Felzen exemplifies this problem-the ulti-
mate settlement amount paled in comparison to the ADM
332. See id.
333. See supra Part II.C.
334. See supra Part III.C.
335. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991).
336. See Brandi, supra note 286, at 368-69.
337. Klein & Coffee, supra note 253, at 196; see also Brandi, supra note 286, at
369 (discussing the prevalence of collusive settlements in the context of meritori-
ous derivative actions).
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directors' guilty plea and $100 million criminal antitrust fine.338
Consequently, the intervention requirement imposed in Felzen ef-
fectively precluded judicial review of a typically unfair settlement.
Several reasons exist for unfair settlements in derivative ac-
tions. First, the named shareholder-plaintiffs in derivative suits
rarely monitor the attorney's negotiations. 339 Likewise, the un-
named shareholders are unable to monitor the attorney's work be-
cause the costs of such monitoring will often exceed the value of
their claims.340 As a result, plaintiffs' attorneys are able to negoti-
ate settlements that benefit their own self interests, while ignoring
the interests of the corporation and shareholders.
Furthermore, in terms of settlement, the incentives for plain-
tiffs' attorneys and defendants conflict with those of the sharehold-
ers.34 1 Plaintiffs' attorneys have strong economic incentives "to
settle the a before trial, in spite of the merits of the case, because of
conflicts between the attorney's personal desire to garner high fees
and the underlying goal of maximizing recovery for the client."3 42
By the same token, defendants in derivative actions have personal
and economic incentives to settle the case as quickly as possible.343
Certainly, these incentive conflicts exist, notwithstanding the par-
ticular merits of a derivative suit.3 "
Two unnamed shareholder-appellants in Felzen struggled to
contest the faithfulness of the named plaintiffs and their attorneys,
as well as the fairness of the settlement agreement. Considering
338. The merit of the shareholders' derivative suit is undeniable. The ADM
directors paid the largest criminal antitrust fine ever imposed, in addition to an-
other $90 million to settle three civil antitrust lawsuits. See Brief for Petitioner at
3, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No.
97-1732).
339. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role
in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommenda-
tions for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1991).
340. See id. at 19-20.
341. See id. at 22-27.
342. Brandi, supra note 286, at 385; see also Kostant, supra note 271, at 1539
n.37 (citing Second Circuit authority asserting that there may be differences of
interest in case).
343. See Brandi, supra note 286, at 386-88. Brandi provides two reasons why
derivative defendants settle as soon as possible: (1) individual director defendants
seek to avoid the risk of potential liability in the pending suit and (2) the existence
of corporate insurance may cover the costs of director liability. See Brandi, supra
note 286, at 386-88.
344. See Brandi, supra note 286, at 386.
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the directors' extensive criminal and civil liability, the merits of
the suit were obvious. As the Third Circuit aptly explained the
problem: "[pilaintiffs' attorneys and the defendants may settle in a
manner adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs by exchanging a
low settlement for high fees. Such a risk cautions against creating
obstacles to challenging derivative action settlement agree-
ments."3 45 Indeed, this is precisely what happened in Felzen-the
Seventh Circuit declined to review the fairness of the settlement
by requiring the extra hurdle of intervention.
CONCLUSION
In 1987, courts began to require intervention for unnamed
party appeals. During the past thirteen years, though, courts have
split as to whether unnamed class members must intervene in or-
der to appeal a judgment in class actions. Guthrie's line of reason-
ing, however, provided a legitimate argument for an intervention
requirement in class actions.3 46 Other courts also adhered to the
intervention requirement as a result of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Marino.3 47 Nevertheless, until Felzen, no court had ever
required intervention for shareholders in derivative actions.
The reason for this is not clear.348 However, this Note high-
lights several reasons why courts should not require intervention
for unnamed shareholders in derivative suits. More importantly,
courts should not examine class actions and derivative suits collec-
tively because they are very different mechanisms of representa-
tive litigation. A separate analysis of class and derivative actions
dictates a more liberal appeals procedure for unnamed sharehold-
ers in derivative suits than for unnamed class members in class
actions. Thus, the intervention requirement acts as an unneces-
sary burden for unnamed shareholders who seek an appeal in de-
rivative actions.
The Seventh Circuit, in Felzen, came to an opposite conclusion
by relying on authority that does not consider the unique position
345. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted).
346. See supra Part II.A.
347. See supra Part II.A.
348. This proposition is made in reference to the Supreme Court's decision to
affirm Felzen, per curiam, by an equally divided court. See California Pub. Em-
ployees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (per curiam).
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of unnamed shareholders in derivative actions. The Supreme
Court summarily affirmed this decision by an equally divided
court. Thus, until the issue in FeIzen resurfaces, the appellate
rights of unnamed shareholders in derivative litigation will remain
unprotected.
Rory Zack Fazendeiro
